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## Fair use and copyright protection: a price theory explanation

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### Abstract

Copyright scholars suggest that computer technology has reduced transaction costs associated with copyright transfer, allegedly eliminating the need for the fair-use doctrines that were developed to allow limited use of copyrighted material in situations where the transaction costs of securing authorized use would be prohibitive. According to this emerging view, in an ideal world with no contracting costs, third party use of copyrighted material could realistically only take place with the express consent of the copyright holder. This would give the author absolute power to dispose of his work, including the right to veto uses, without the possibility of a fair use “override” of any sort.

This paper shows the limits of such transaction cost-based arguments. If transaction costs provide the dominant economic justification of “fair-use” doctrines, an exogenous reduction of such transaction costs would limit the scope and application of the defense of fair use. Nevertheless, in this paper we suggest that, when viewed in light of the anticommons theory, fair-use doctrines retain a valid efficiency justification even in a zero transaction-cost environment. Fair-use defenses are justifiable, and in fact instrumental, in minimizing the welfare losses prompted by the strategic behavior of the copyright holders. Even if copyright licenses can be transferred at no cost (for instance, in a “click and pay” frictionless computer world), the strategic behavior of the copyright holders would still create possible deadweight losses.

In this context, we identify a number of critical variables that should guide and constrain the application of fair-use doctrines. These variables include (a) the number of copyright holders; (b) the degree of

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complementarity between the copyrighted inputs; (c) the degree of independence between the various copyright holders in the pricing of their licenses; and (d) ability to price discriminate. © 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.

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When new technological advances in the dissemination of information conflict with the precepts of standard copyright law, the doctrine of fair use, which delineates limited circumstances under which the work may be used without the author's permission, is called upon to reconcile the two. Proponents of new technology and copyright holders generally stand diametrically opposed when it comes to determining the proper scope of the fair-use defense<sup>1</sup> in the information age. The mass popularization of the Internet and continued technological advances in information dissemination has produced a new argument that goes one step further: fair use will become obsolete in a world where one-click technology provides instantaneous communication between copyright holders and users.<sup>2</sup> Universally accessible Internet gateways will allegedly provide copyright holders the opportunity to charge users of their works licensing fees in quasi-automatic fashion, eliminating the transaction-cost argument that provides one of the main pragmatic justifications of fair use. In turn—the argument goes—the traditional rationales for the existence of fair-use doctrines will lose their persuasive power.

In this paper, we revisit the economic justification of fair-use doctrines,<sup>3</sup> providing an alternative positive hypothesis for the emergence, and adoption, of the fair-use doctrine and comparable rules in various legal systems. We find flawed arguments that the economic rationale for fair-use doctrines has been lost because such claims unduly simplify the nature of the costs which explain the emergence and success of the doctrine of fair use. Offering insights from the concept of the Tragedy of the Anticommons, we argue that fair use remains valuable even in the digital context of automated rights management. We conclude that any claim of the demise of the fair use in this context is that of the tunnel-visioned enthusiast.

## **1. The doctrine of fair use**

The general purpose of intellectual property protection, and more specifically, copyright protection, is to provide authors with incentives to create, by providing 'an avenue for obtaining remuneration'.<sup>4</sup> Although the ultimate goal of copyright law is 'the promotion, advancement and dissemination of culture and knowledge',<sup>5</sup> the copyright market corrects the public good nature of copyrighted work by providing author compensation, thereby excluding non-purchasers and promoting voluntary transfer between authors and users.<sup>6</sup> Just like in any other market situation with voluntary participation, through this mechanism, the interests of authors and the public will find a point of convergence: the possibility of remuneration prompts authors to produce and distribute work, thereby serving the public interest in the advancement and dissemination of science and art.<sup>7</sup>

Sometimes, however, value-maximizing transfers of copyrighted works fail. For this reason, defense-doctrines have emerged<sup>8</sup> in modern legal systems in order to resolve those cases

where the monopolistic protection of authors' rights through strict copyright enforcement might 'defeat, rather than serve the public interest in dissemination'.<sup>9</sup> Specifically, the doctrine of fair use, codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107, allows 'fair' use and reproduction of copyrighted works for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship and research.<sup>10</sup> A 'fair' use, although technically forbidden by copyright law, will not be considered as copyright infringement.<sup>11</sup> Other legal systems contain comparable legal rules limiting the scope of copyright protection, such as the French '*droit de citation*' and the British right of 'parody'.

The Statute provides limited guidance on what constitutes 'fair use', providing only an open-ended, non-determinative list of precedential factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether it is commercial for non-profit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work itself; (3) whether the section used constitutes a substantial portion of the work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for, and value of, the copyrighted work (17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976)). There are no explicit instructions inherent in the Statute as to how the court is to weigh each of these elements. It is, therefore, left to the courts to further develop and elaborate the substance of the doctrine.<sup>12</sup>

A survey of the history of the doctrine of fair use reveals the problematic nature of its application. It is one of the more complex and difficult concepts in copyright law and has resulted in a number of subsisting misconceptions.<sup>13</sup> Striking the right balance between authors' individual rights and the public interest in dissemination is not an obvious task for courts.<sup>14</sup>

Due to the elusive formulation of the statute, little guidance is provided on the mechanics for adjudicating a fair use case or for the expected outcome of a fair use case.<sup>15</sup> The doctrine does not easily lend itself to economic analysis since it allows users to bypass the market. Fair use thereby forsakes the informational function of the price mechanism and therefore offers no general guarantee of Pareto optimality, namely that the user and author would have naturally bargained to a point approximating the fair use reallocation of resources.

## 2. The market failure approach to fair use and its echo in subsequent case law

In 1982, Wendy Gordon proposed a market failure rationale for the doctrine of fair use.<sup>16</sup> Within the inherent economic logic of copyright law itself, the defense of fair use is a 'corrective response'<sup>17</sup> to the presence of transactional barriers: whenever 'obstacles to market formation are serious enough to frustrate access by selling, licensing, and other modes of consensual transfer', free copying should be permitted.<sup>18</sup> If there are impediments to the smooth-functioning of the copyright marketplace, or if there is a 'reason to mistrust the market',<sup>19</sup> the doctrine promotes dissemination of information without drastically reducing the incentives for creativity.<sup>20</sup>

One should note that this argument is a mere extension of the normative Coase theorem, in as much as the fair-use doctrine effectively "reallocates" ownership rights in order to minimize the negative efficiency consequences of positive transaction costs in the market. Fair-use defenses allow the bypassing of the actual market transaction, permitting the use of copyrighted work when the transaction costs that would be necessary for the actual transfer exceeds the

surplus from the exchange. The doctrine, therefore, eliminates the transaction-cost impediments, resulting in a—potentially efficient—reallocation of scarce resources.

Two recent appellate court cases demonstrate the far reaching influence of this market failure argument on determinations of what constitutes fair use; in both cases, the absence of market failure was the conclusive rationale for rulings against fair use. In *American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.*<sup>21</sup> a number of publishers brought a class action suit against Texaco for copyright infringement by its research department. Texaco's unauthorized photocopying of articles from scientific journals was found not to constitute fair use. In *Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc.*<sup>22</sup> the courts dismissed the fair use claim of a copy shop for the sale of 'coursepacks' assigned by University of Michigan professors.

Both cases primarily revolve around the fourth factor in U.S.C. § 107, namely 'the effect of the use upon the potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work'. On both occasions the fact that plaintiffs maintained a permission system militated strongly against the court finding fair use. In *American Geophysical* the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC),<sup>23</sup> a copyright clearinghouse, provided users with a procedure for obtaining authorization; whereas in *Princeton*, the publishers had set up permissions departments. These factors led the court to assume that there was an established derivative market for licensing permissions that deserved protection from economic harm.

In both decisions, the court reasoned that lost license fees constituted market harm.<sup>24</sup> The fact that the plaintiffs provided a collection service weighed further against the defendants. In the words of Judge Newman in *American Geophysical*: "a particular unauthorized use should be considered "more fair" when there is no ready market or means to pay for the use, while such an unauthorized use should be considered "less fair" when there is a ready market or means to pay for the use".<sup>25</sup>

### 3. The proclaimed demise of fair use

From *Princeton* and *American Geophysical*, it is only a short step to the theory, articulated in a recent strand of literature, that the advent of the Internet<sup>26</sup> has brought with it the demise of fair use. Based upon the misguided premise that the fair-use defense should fail whenever copyright owners can conveniently collect licensing fees,<sup>27</sup> as expressed in *American Geophysical*, several copyright scholars have suggested that computer technology is reducing the transaction costs that impede socially beneficial transfers and uses.<sup>28</sup> The reason is said to be that the Internet allows copyright holders to install on-line, universally accessible, licensing systems that enable users to obtain permission with the click of a mouse.<sup>29</sup> Without any concerns about transaction costs, copyright holders should then be able to exercise unrestricted veto power over any use of their work, obviating fair-use defenses of any sort. In other words, 'because the contemporary fair-use doctrine is predicated on a market failure rationale, and because an electronic exchange potentially eliminates this market failure for digital content, fair use law will significantly shrink' (Merges, 1997, p. 130).

A similar refrain is heard from executive and legislative branches of government. The NII White Paper, the final report from the Working Group on Intellectual Property of the Information Infrastructure Task Force,<sup>30</sup> envisions (and promotes) a world where the 'technological

means of tracking transactions and licensing’ may ‘lead to reduced application and scope of the fair-use doctrine’.<sup>31</sup>

Such a view is premised on a simplified conception both of transaction costs and the type of market failure that necessitates the defense of fair use. As Loren (1997) has commented, “A permission system only remedies the market failure that occurs because of high transaction costs . . .”. Moreover, it reduces those transactions costs that are only related to search or tracing costs.<sup>32</sup> Loren argues that this narrow view of transaction costs ignores the doctrine’s potential to internalize external social benefits into the calculus of the transferee.<sup>33</sup>

This argument relies on the assumption that the creator of a derivative work generates positive externalities for the final users of his new secondary work that he cannot capture through the price. The existence of positive social benefits that cannot be internalized through the price system would lead to a less-than-optimal supply of derivative work or, in the present context, a less-than-optimal consumption of goods that spawn positive externalities.<sup>34</sup> In Loren’s world, thus, the owner’s release of the original work comes to rescue, subsidizing the production of derivative work by allowing a ‘fair (and free) use’ of intellectual property to offset the inability of the intermediate producers to capture the full social benefits of their activity.

This solution obviously begs the question of why the producers of the original work should bear the entire cost of the subsidy, rather than spreading its cost across a broader group of individuals.<sup>35</sup> The reader may also wonder why one should assume or estimate a systematic correspondence between the value of positive social externalities of the derivative work and the value derived from the free use of the primary work.

#### 4. Other economic rationales for fair-use doctrines

Gordon’s seminal explanation of fair use hinges in large part on market failures based on transaction costs. Although the first part of her three part test is contingent upon the existence of market failures of some sort, she alludes to three broad types of impediments: market barriers, externalities, and anti-dissemination motives. Transaction costs, in the classic sense of the costs of reaching and enforcing a bargain, are listed as one specific type of market barrier.<sup>36</sup> Especially where transaction costs are higher than the anticipated benefits from the bargain, value maximizing transfers might be prevented.<sup>37</sup> In addition, when the individual costs and benefits of a use differ substantially from the social costs and benefits, or when a particular use is not easily monetized, a socially beneficial transaction may be impaired.<sup>38</sup> Finally, the desire to restrict the flow of information, prompting an author to refuse a given use, may “trigger” a distrust of the market.<sup>39</sup>

Commentators have mistakenly equated Gordon’s first market barrier, transaction costs, with ‘search costs’, thereby concluding that the universal accessibility of the Internet would erode the market failure grounds that predicate fair use. Although Gordon does acknowledge the opportunity to reduce transaction costs by the introducing new technology<sup>40</sup>—copyright clearing houses are offered as an illustration of the institutions that might arise to ameliorate certain transaction costs<sup>41</sup>—this is a somewhat curious reading of the first part of Gordon’s test, which in no way commits itself to such simplified view of transaction costs.

Commentators have occasionally hinted at transaction costs beyond mere ‘search costs’. Merges (1996) acknowledges failures in the market for parodies and the possible ‘breakdown of bargaining under bilateral monopoly conditions’.<sup>42</sup> As mentioned above, Loren (1997) argues that the main purpose of fair use is to take into account external benefits that are not included in the calculus of the copyright holder. Dowell (1998), makes reference to possible bargaining costs (the market for the use of copyrighted work requires price-discrimination to an extent that parties will always need to bargain to reach a ‘just’ price), externalities (when ‘all costs and benefits are not internal to the transaction’) and anti-dissemination (refusal for reason unrelated to the price) motives.

The transactive process of copyright transfer entails considerable complexity. This paper shall provide insight into the category of deadweight losses inherent in this context. In the words of Loren (1996, p. 7), “[i]f courts are going to employ a market failure approach to fair use, a complete recognition of all the potential types of market failures that can occur relating to uses of copyrighted works is critical to maintaining the appropriate balance in copyright law”.

## **5. Revisiting the economic rationale: anticommons and the doctrine of fair use**

A new term of art has recently gained acceptance among law and economics scholars of property law: the anticommons. Michelman (1982) coined the term anticommons in an article on ethics, economics, and the law of property, defining it as ‘a type of property in which everyone always has rights respecting the objects in the regime, and no one, consequently, is ever privileged to use any of them except as particularly authorized by others’. The concept has been revitalized in recent literature (Buchanan & Yoon, 2000; Heller, 1997; Parisi, Schultz, & Depoorter, 2000), and has come to describe ‘a property regime in which multiple owners hold effective rights of exclusion regarding a scarce resource’.<sup>43</sup>

The concept of anticommons is a mirror-image—in name and in fact—of Hardin’s (1968) well-known tragedy of the commons, which describes the situation in which multiple individuals are privileged to use a given resource without a cost effective way to monitor and constrain each other’s use, making the resource vulnerable to overuse. Conversely, when multiple owners have the right to exclude others from taking advantage of a scarce resource, and no one has an enforceable privilege of use, the resource might be underutilized: a problem known as the Tragedy of the Anticommons.

These recent contributions have initiated an examination into a very important subject, with powerful implications that range well beyond the original applications. As Buchanan and Yoon (2000) suggest, the anticommons is a useful metaphor for understanding why potential economic value may “disappear into the black-hole of resource underutilization”. Parisi et al. (2000) have explored the extent of such underutilization in different anticommons cases.

In this paper, we hold that, in light of the anticommons insight, fair-use doctrines retain a valid efficiency justification even in a zero transaction-cost environment. Fair-use defenses can be regarded as justifiable and instrumental in minimizing the welfare losses occasioned by the strategic behavior of the copyright holders. Even if copyright licenses can be transferred at no cost (for instance, in a “click and pay” frictionless computer world), the strategic behavior

of the copyright holders would still create possible deadweight losses that the fair-use doctrine can mitigate.

## 6. The price theory of copyright protection: a numerical example

Building on the general framework of Buchanan and Yoon (2000) and Parisi et al. (2000), we shall illustrate the problem of the anticommons in the context of copyright protection considering the case of two copyright holders who have autonomous exclusion rights over two distinct works (primary works). In our hypothetical, the copyrighted primary works are complementary inputs for the production of a derivative work, such as an anthology or review essay on the topic of the Coase theorem. Such compilation requires the inclusion of passages from the relevant primary sources on the same subject (e.g., Calabresi-Melamed, 1972; Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1972, etc.), each of which is essential to the success of the anthology and therefore, can be thought of as strict complementary inputs in the production function of the final derivative work (i.e., the anthology). We will refer to these factors of production as non-substitutable inputs. Other primary sources are less essential to the completion of the anthology, since it would be easy to substitute any one of those less essential sources without compromising the quality and success of the final product. We will refer to this category of less essential inputs as substitutable inputs.

In the absence of a fair-use defense, a third party who wishes to utilize passages from the above mentioned primary sources needs to obtain the consent of all copyright holders. In our example, the editor or author of the derivative work has to purchase copyright licenses from all relevant parties. For the sake of simplicity, let's contemplate (a) a frictionless environment, where copyright agreements can be stipulated without any additional contracting cost; and (b) assume that the competition among the various copyright owners of substitutable inputs drives the price of those inputs to marginal cost. In such an environment, what would be the Nash equilibrium pricing of the non substitutable inputs?

The producer of the final (derivative) work will have to purchase copyright licenses (one from each copyright owner) at a price of  $p_i$ . The value of a copyright license is  $V - Q$ , where  $Q$  denotes the number of licenses issued for comparable projects. Note that the efficient number of licenses is therefore, obtained by maximizing  $Q(V - Q)$  which gives the value  $Q^s = V/2$ . Note also that if only one agent owns all copyrights of the primary work, he would rationally choose the price  $p^m = V/2$  (each licensee pays the price  $p = V - Q$ , hence profits are  $p(V - p)$  and the maximizing price is  $V/2$ ). Therefore, given the full internalization of the cross-price effects of the monopolistic pricing of the copyright license, this monopolist just chooses the efficient price.

Let's compare the hypothetical single agent (monopolist) case to a real world alternative where copyrights are held by different individuals. Recalling our example, let's imagine that Coase, Demsetz, and Calabresi are the authors of the essential contributions to the field and let's assume that these scholars charge prices without coordination among themselves,  $p_1$ ,  $p_2$  and  $p_3$ , respectively. In this setting, the number of users has to satisfy  $p_1 + p_2 + p_3 = V - Q$ . Hence  $p_1$ ,  $p_2$  and  $p_3$  result in a demand for the inputs of the anthology  $Q = V - p_1 - p_2 - p_3$ . This in turn leads to profits for agent 1:  $p_1(V - p_1 - p_2 - p_3)$ . Let each agent charge the

price which maximizes his profit. The corresponding first-order condition for agent 1 is:  $V - 2p_1 - p_2 - p_3 = 0$ . For agents 2 and 3 analogous equations can be derived. This leads to equilibrium values of  $p_1 = p_2 = p_3 = V/4$  or  $p_1 + p_2 + p_3 = 3V/4$ .

Hence, the uncoordinated choices of Coase, Demsetz, and Calabresi result in a higher total cost of clearing copyright permissions and therefore, to an underutilization of their primary work, beyond what any one of them would do as a concentrated owner of all copyrights, in order to maximize his own monopolistic profit. Interestingly, the “competitive” supply of copyright licenses leads to higher prices than those that would be charged by a single concentrated monopolist.

The differences between the two equilibria are due to the presence of negative externalities in the independent choices of the copyright holders.<sup>44</sup>

As shown by Parisi et al. (2000), the sources of externalities in an anticommons problem are two-fold. First, there are static (or current) externalities, in which the exercise of a right of exclusion by one individual reduces or eliminates the value of similar rights held by other individuals. In our example, we can think of this externality as the cross-price effect of the various copyright license fees. Secondly, the withholding of productive resources may create dynamic (or future) externalities, because the underuse of productive inputs today bears its consequences into the future. Thus, the undersupply of copyrighted inputs has long-term effects on the capital value of such resources. The independent pricing of present licenses does not take into account such long-term effects on third parties.

## 7. The limits of copyright protection and the Tragedy of the Anticommons

In Section 6, we have shown that independent pricing of copyright licenses for the production of a final derivative work results in a sub-optimal equilibrium. We should note that an increase in the number of copyright holders exercising independent control on the price of their respective licenses exacerbates the degree of underutilization.

Recalling our example, let’s imagine that the planned anthology will present and analyze excerpts from the acceptance speeches of all the Nobel laureates in economics. Let’s further assume that the copyrights are owned by the individual Nobel laureates, and that the publication of such survey will therefore, necessitate the acquisition of the copyright licenses from such large number of individuals. What would be the equilibrium price of such licenses if the copyright owners are pricing their licenses independently from one another?

The solution to this  $n$  person pricing problem comes from a generalization of the solution outlined above. In the case of  $n$  copyright owners charging prices  $p_i$  without coordination among themselves, the number of users has to satisfy  $3p_i \{i = 1, \dots, n\} = V - Q$ . Hence the independent prices charged by the various Nobel laureates for a copyright license to reprint portions of their work,  $p_i$ , result in a demand for the anthology inputs  $Q = V - 3p_i \{i = 1, \dots, n\}$ . This in turn leads to profits for Nobel laureate 1:  $p_1(V - 3p_i \{i = 1, \dots, n\})$ . Let each Nobel laureate charge the price which maximizes his profit. The corresponding first-order condition for laureate 1 is:  $V - 2p_1 - 3p_i \{i = 1, \dots, n + 1\} = 0$ , with similar first-order conditions for all other laureates. This leads to equilibrium prices for all copyright sellers of  $p_i = V/(n + 1)$ , with a total cost for the anthology producer of  $3p_i \{i = 1, \dots, n\} = nV/(n + 1)$ .



The analysis shows that the severity of the deadweight losses from concurrent copyright protection increases monotonically with the number of independent copyright holders. The greater the number of individuals who can independently price an essential input, the higher the equilibrium price that each of these individuals will demand for his own license. At the margin, as the number of copyright holders approaches very large numbers (or infinity), complete abandonment of valuable resources will result.

## 8. The boundaries of the anticommons problem in copyright protection

The examples above demonstrate that independent pricing of copyright licenses for the production of a final derivative work will result in a sub-optimal equilibrium. We should note that the equations utilized above assume a strict complementarity of the copyright licenses as factors of production for the anthology. A more general model which allows, but does not require, the strict complementarity of the inputs can be shown to produce qualitatively similar results. The relationship between various factors of production could, indeed, vary. Furthermore, the interconnection between the copyrighted inputs may instead reveal partial (or less-than-perfect) complementarity in the production of the derivative work. The case of strict complementarity thus represents a special case of the more general anticommons problem discussed in Parisi et al. (2000).

Cases of less-than-perfect complementarity are more realistic in ordinary copyright situations. Unlike the exceptional cases of essential production inputs (e.g., the selected quotes from Coase's 1960 article, in our anthology example), most inputs in the production of derivative work can, with more or less ease, be substituted with other comparable sources. With imperfect complementarity, withholding a copyrighted input reduces, yet does not eliminate, both the ability to produce a derivative work and its final value.

The cases of strict complementarity and perfect substitutability of the inputs can be seen as the dual end points along a continuum, where the relevant variable captures the cross-price effect between the pricing of the copyrighted material. In the case of strict complementarity, as we have seen above, copyright owners can impose external costs on the sellers of other complementary inputs, due to the cross-price effects between the goods. Conversely, in the case of perfect substitutability, the copyright owner is unable to impose any external cost on the owners of other copyrighted material, due to the Bertrand-type competition between the various sellers.<sup>45</sup>

We can think of these two hypotheses as the end points around the case of a single owner of all copyrighted inputs. Such a concentrated monopolist fully internalizes the costs and benefits in the pricing and withholding of copyright licenses. The external effects of the decisions of the copyright holders are the root cause of the deadweight losses that increase monotonically with the number of inputs to production.

## 9. The absence of price coordination

This paper's analysis reveals the puzzling result that price coordination and monopolistic pricing do not in all circumstances produce inefficient equilibria. More specifically, the effect

of monopolistic price coordination on the efficiency of the equilibrium pricing depends on the nature of the various copyrights as factors of production. As suggested above, the failure of copyright holders to coordinate prices among themselves always leads to a loss of profit from anticommons pricing.

The failure of the various copyright holders to coordinate prices has ambiguous effects with respect to the resulting social deadweight loss.

If the copyrights are in a relationship of complementarity in the production of a derivative work, the competitive Nash equilibrium would generate anticommons pricing, making both society and the individual copyright sellers worse off. The anticommons equilibrium pricing is in fact the outcome of a prisoner's dilemma problem that the individual copyright sellers face when pricing their copyrights independently from one another. As in a traditional prisoner's dilemma game, the inability of copyright holders to coordinate prices produces a result that is both privately and socially inefficient. Quite strikingly, in this case the competitive outcome is socially inefficient, even if compared to the alternative monopoly equilibrium. Competitive pricing of the complementary goods generates a substantially larger social loss than the monopolistic equilibrium.

If the copyrights are substitutes in the production function of the derivative work, the inability of the copyright sellers to coordinate their prices will also be detrimental for them. As in the previous case, the independent and uncoordinated pricing of the copyrights renders the monopolistic pricing unsustainable in a Nash equilibrium, with a loss of profit for the various sellers. Unlike the complementarity case considered above, however, the competition among copyright sellers would be beneficial for society at large. In this case, in fact, the substitutability of the copyrights as inputs of production leads to the usual negative price effect. The resulting equilibrium—albeit Pareto inferior for all the players—is socially preferable to the alternative monopoly outcome.

The analysis above applies even when parties can costlessly negotiate agreements concerning the transfer of copyright licenses from authors to users. If strategic behavior is not prevented by the ability of users of copyrighted work to “click and pay” in order to obtain copyright licenses, sub-optimal equilibria may still result from the independent pricing of copyright licenses for the production of a final derivative work. In light of this, the defense of fair use retains an important, albeit residual, role in minimizing the deadweight losses, even where the digital market allows individual copyright owners to enter into transactions and to collect licensing fees at low cost.

## **10. The effect of price coordination**

In an ideal world where copyright owners could effectively coordinate their on-line licensing efforts, the above result would be considerably changed. If the fragmented group of copyright holders could coordinate the pricing of their licenses—when each copyrighted material serves as complementary input in the production of a final good, such as in our review essay example—they would clearly be able to act as a single monopolist, jointly maximizing their gains. In fact, one important aspect of many on-line licensing initiatives is the coordination by intermediaries that have collected a broad portfolio of copyrighted works. In this setting, it may be important

to consider the impact of copyright databases, such as held by copyright collectives, rather than that of individual copyright owners, on the two equilibrium hypotheses discussed above. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to examine the role of copyright collectives (in a related paper, we analyze the role of copyright collectives—both in the framework of antitrust regulation and the actual practices of collectives in relation to anticommons fragmentation),<sup>46</sup> the coordination role played by copyright intermediaries deserves some brief remarks here.

Where copyright collectives and intermediaries offer copyright licensing on the Internet, they often retain the independent power to specify the price for individual transactions.<sup>47</sup> These institutions regularly engage in third degree price discrimination, charging different prices to various broad categories of licensees (e.g., for profit/non-profit organizations, discounts for the number of seats in a venue, number of listeners of the radio station, station wattage, etc.).<sup>48</sup>

In this respect, the intermediaries maintain some independence in the pricing and packaging of their product. Such independent authority to fix the price of licenses has an obvious effect on the two equilibria considered above: in the “complements” case, the presence of an intermediary with autonomous pricing authority is socially beneficial, because it prevents the tragic anticommons result, and produce a smaller deadweight loss for society. In the “substitutes” case, however, the results are quite different because, in the absence of such price coordination, copyright owners would have competed with one another, generating a more efficient competitive (or oligopolistic) equilibrium.

It is interesting to note that in the complements scenario, the intermediary would choose prices that are lower than the prices that would have been chosen by the copyright holders, if pricing independently from one another. Quite notably, the lower price charged by the intermediary is beneficial to all individual copyright sellers, since it allows them to maximize the total profit from the sale of their licenses, improving upon the alternative anticommons result reached in the absence of price coordination. The paradox—intermediaries price is lower than the one that would have been chosen by the owners and yet it increases their total profits from the sale—can be understood by recalling that the anticommons equilibrium pricing is the outcome of a “prisoner’s dilemma” problem that the individual copyright sellers face when pricing their copyrights independently from one another. In effect, intermediaries make possible the price coordination that the owners could not organize for themselves, a benefit for society as well as for the owners themselves.

Opposite conclusions are reached in the case of substitutes. Here, a concentrated intermediary with independent price fixing authority renders the monopolistic pricing sustainable in a Nash equilibrium. In this instance, the resulting equilibrium favors the copyright owners because they are able to maximize the total profit from the sale of their licenses, as it would happen in a perfect cartel. But such coordination is socially inefficient compared to the alternative competitive (or oligopolistic) equilibrium, since it prevents beneficial competition with the creation of a social deadweight loss.<sup>49</sup>

## 11. Conclusion

This paper revisits the economic rationale for fair-use defenses suggesting that, in light of the anticommons insight, fair-use doctrines retain a valid efficiency justification even in low

transaction-cost environments. Expanding upon the traditional economic logic of copyright law, we suggest that fair-use defenses are instrumental in minimizing the welfare losses caused by the strategic behavior of the copyright holders. The defense of fair use can be regarded as a corrective response to the deadweight losses occasioned by the presence of strategic incentives of copyright owners in anticommons situations.

The emergence of a “click and pay” economy, while reducing the transaction costs of copyright transfers, does not necessarily eliminate the strategic pricing of copyright licenses. Whenever anticommons costs are serious enough to undermine the viability of the transaction, fair-use doctrines become a valuable tool for mitigating the resulting deadweight losses. In the presence of such impediments to the optimal functioning of the copyright marketplace, the doctrine serves the purpose of promoting dispersion of information without drastically reducing the incentives for creativity.

Contrary to traditional economic justifications, the anticommons rationale provides a very discriminating justification for fair-use defenses. The anticommons deadweight losses contemplated in this paper are different in nature from the traditional deadweight losses of copyright owners with a monopolistic market power. Indeed, Section 5 and this paper use the single monopolist pricing as the “efficient” benchmark against which the anticommons deadweight losses are measured. Anticommons losses, while requiring some degree of market power for the copyright holders, are not identifiable with the typical deadweight losses of the monopolists. At the limit, anticommons losses disappear as the various copyright holders coordinate their pricing behaving as a single monopolist.

The extent of the ameliorative role to which the monopoly-coordinated benchmark can be attained by the institutional design of copyright collectives, is delimited to the complementary nature of the various copyright works and the assumption of inclusiveness of the copyright collective’s repertory.

Far from providing a blanket justification for fair use in all cases of market power of the copyright sellers, our analysis identifies several critical variables that should guide and constraint the application of fair-use doctrines. These variables include (a) the number of copyright holders; (b) the degree of complementarity between the copyrighted inputs; (c) the degree of independence between the various copyright holders in the pricing of their licenses; and (d) ability to price discriminate.

It is possible that the same anticommons logic offers an explanation for several other doctrines which exclude copyright protection with respect to procedures, methods of operation, systems, concepts, principles, or discoveries. Most of the above items are in fact likely to be instrumental—and, more precisely, are likely to serve as complementary inputs—in the production of future applicative or derivative work. Due to their content, all such items, if granted full copyright protection, would create possible conditions of over-fragmentation in intellectual property with potential underuse of valuable intellectual resources.

## Notes

1. Generally, the key role of fair use in resolving tension between new technology and traditional copyright is well appreciated, see Marsh (1984, p. 635): “Successful

resolution of the resulting tension between products of the new technologies and copyright law will depend largely on the doctrine of fair use”.

2. See Bell (1998) arguing that fair use will, to a large extent, be replaced by ‘fared use’, where automated rights management (ARM) will become the dominant instrument for copyright transfer; Kitch (2000), examining the potential effect of both a structural approach (denying fair use treatment when the copyright owner *could* have established Internet permission) and a transactional one (fair use falters only in situations that Internet permissions *are* easily available) in leading to a reduced scope of fair use; Merges (1997), pondering the reduced role of fair use, while proposing a new, subsidy-oriented, foundation for the fair-use doctrine that would better emphasize the doctrine’s redistributive concerns; Post (1996), arguing that automated rights management techniques drastically reduce transaction costs of negotiating licence fees, thereby calling into question the role of fair use. But see, Dowell (1998), examining the prospect of fair use in the context of fragmented literal copying of small chunks of content, concluding that the cost-minimization function of automated licensing does not take into consideration the public benefit purpose of fair use.
3. At the outset, we would like to distinguish the context of this article from the related issue of copyright protection for digital content on the Internet. The following provide a discussion of recent developments on Internet specific-fair use. See Ginsburg (2000), Okediji (2001) (arguing that the underpinnings of the fair-use doctrine have significant utility in determining the rights of providers and users in cyberspace and that the fair-use doctrine is the superior mechanism for safeguarding the public interest in a way that facilitates dispersion of the new benefits that the Internet offers to society as a whole). See also Cohen (1996) (evaluating the import of digital monitoring on traditional notions of thought and expression. Argues that the right to read anonymously is so intimately connected with speech and freedom of thought that the First Amendment should be understood to guarantee such a right); O’Rourke (1998) (arguing that law in cyberspace should evolve from a comparison not of the boundaries between physical and virtual space but the boundaries between different sets of laws. More specifically, scholars and legislators must consider the relationship between different branches of the public intellectual property law, particularly the relationship between copyright and trademark).
4. Gordon (1982, p. 1602), with reference to *Mazer v. Stein*, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). Generally it is understood that copyright provides a private market in a non-rival and non-excludable public good. The public good notion and underproduction paradigm of intellectual property is part of the collective wisdom of mainstream economic analysis; see, e.g., Dowell (1998, p. 854), Cirace (1984, pp. 656–659), Loren (1997, pp. 22–24), and Ciolino (1997, pp. 53–56). Okediji (2001, pp. 139–140), Landes and Posner (1989), Adelstein and Peretz (1985), Cooter and Ulen (2000).
5. Gordon (1982, p. 1602, at note 21, referring to *Rosemont Enter, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.*, 366 F. 2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967)). See also, generally, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 8, in which Congress is empowered to grant authors and inventors exclusive rights over their works in order ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts’.

6. This view is not uncontested, see Gordon (1982, p. 1610, note 63); for a review of the debate on the economic necessity to maintain a copyright system, see, e.g., Landes and Posner (1989, pp. 325, 328–332), Novos and Waldman (1984), Dam (1995).
7. For a historical account of copyright under the Common Law, see, e.g., Kaplan (1967, p. 142), Lawrence and Bernard (1989, pp. 3–36). The balance between the private and the public interest in copyright matters was acknowledged in the writings of Lord Mansfield: ‘We must take care to guard against two extremes, equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time and the service of the community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their labor and ingenuity; the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts retarded’; cited in Weinberg (1975, p. 107).
8. The common law doctrine of fair use is generally thought to have grown out of Justice Story’s decision in *Folsom v. Marsh*, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Nass. 1841) (No. 4901): ‘[I]n cases of copyright . . . the question of piracy[ ] often depend[s] upon a nice balance of the comparative use made in one of the materials of the other; the nature, extent, and value of the materials thus used; the object of each work; and the degree to which each writer may be fairly presumed to have resorted to the same common sources of information, or to have exercised the same common diligence in the selection and arrangement of the materials’, cited in Marsh (1984, note 14), Schulman (1986). The term was coined in 1869 in *Lawrence v. Dana*, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136). For more on the origin of the fair-use doctrine, see also Party (1993, pp. 36–40).
9. See, Gordon (1982, p. 1602).
10. Some authors consider the applicability of the doctrine of fair use as the defining characteristic of intellectual property, as compared to other property rights on tangible resources (Ciolino, 1997, p. 56–57). Others (e.g., Loren, 1997) consider it to be critical to copyright’s fundamental purpose of promoting the progress of knowledge and learning: ‘[fair use is] one of the most important counterbalances to the rights granted to copyright owners’; see also Anderson and Brown (1993): ‘[fair use is] a necessary part of copyright law, the observance of which is essential to achieve the goals of that law’.
11. The doctrine of fair use shares with mandatory licensing, reverse engineering, and prohibition of copyright misuse the common purpose of striking a balance between the veto right of the intellectual property rights holder and the public interest of dissemination of the work.
12. See, H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong. & Ad. News, 65–66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 5675–80, “[T]he endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can arise in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact rules in the statute” and, see also, 66 [5681–5683], “. . . the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis”. For an overview of the manner which courts weighed the various individual factors up to 1982, see, Gordon (1982, p. 1604, note 31). The need to deal with the increasing number of technological advances prompted, in part, the 1976 revision of the U.S. Copyright Act (see Marsh, 1984, p. 636, note 7). However, since legislation cannot be expected to keep pace with the flow of innovation, the courts have an augmented role in these matters. Indeed, as

the House Report states: ‘there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change . . . [T]he courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis’. H.R. Rep. No. 1476 94th, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5680. See also, Patry and Perlmutter (1993, pp. 667–719) emphasizing/amplifying the doctrine as fact-specific, flexible, and case by case approach, at p. 719: ‘the desired open-endedness is necessary if the fair-use doctrine is to preserve its function of calibrating the optimal balance of public interests on both sides of the copyright scale’.

13. Patterson and Lindberg (1991, p. 196); for a historical perspective of the doctrine, see Loren (1997, pp. 13–17). In similar vein, see *Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn Inc.*, 104 F. 2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam): fair use is ‘the most troublesome [issue] in the whole law of copyright’.
14. On the related issue of the balance between authors’ individual copyrights and the constitutional right of free speech and fair use’s possible mediating role, see, e.g., Patterson (1987, p. 1-ff.), Harnett (1992, pp. 167–203).
15. Some of the most current general formulations of the doctrine include McDonald’s paraphrasing of the Golden Rule: ‘Take not from others to such an extent and in such a manner that you would be resentful if they took so from you’. McDonald (1962, pp. 466–467) and DeWolf’s classic copyright treatment: ‘a use technically forbidden by the law, but allowed as reasonable and customary, on the theory that the author must have foreseen it and tacitly have accepted it’. See DeWolf (1923).
16. Gordon’s article was framed and published within the course of the debate over the appropriate scope of the fair-use doctrine. The discourse addressed specifically whether or not the doctrine was restricted to users that are ‘productive second authors’ within the context of private home use of VCRs for recording programs broadcast over-the-air without charge (*Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America (Betamax)*, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981)) or applied more generally to all users within the other restrictions of the doctrine within the context of health institutions providing photocopies of medical journals to their staff (*Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States*, 487 F. 2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973) and 420 U.S. 376 (1975)).
17. Dowell (1998, p. 853).
18. Gordon and Bone (2000, p. 202).
19. Gordon (1982, p. 1627). For a critique, see Marsh, *supra* note 1, 670–675 (advocating the sustainability of the traditional standards of fair use within the framework of new technology); for alternative conceptual offerings of fair use see, e.g., Timberg (1980) proposing a bifurcation of fair use into the right to use and access and the right to compensation; Seltzer (1977) proposing a dual risk fair use inquiry to determine whether the use was within the chance the author was taking that he would not be paid and also within the risk society was taking that the author would assert control of access; Anderson and Brown (1993), arguing that economic substitution is the sole appropriate standard by which to evaluate fair use; only secondary works that are not a market substitute for an original work should qualify for fair use treatment; but see Patterson (1987), asserting that fair use, once restricted to competitive use defenses (between competitors and not ‘ordinary’ users), has been extended to include ordinary

use. These ordinary uses historically were not seen as an issue in terms of copyright infringement.

20. Gordon proposes a three part inquiry under which fair use treatment should be accorded (1) is market failure present; (2) is transfer of the use desirable; (3) and can it be done without substantial injury to the copyright owner's incentives, see Gordon (1982, pp. 1614–1623).
21. 60 F. 3d 913, 35 U.S.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 592 (1995).
22. 99 F. 3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997).
23. The CCC is an institution organized by publishers and authors as a clearinghouse for photocopying royalties. It manages republication licensing services which allow users to obtain permissions by way of a streamlined click-through process. Its web page is located at <<<http://www.copyright.com/>>>.
24. Take special notice of the circular argument, voiced in *Princeton's* original panel decision (1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 7474 (6th Cir. 1996)) and recapitulated in the dissent to *Princeton's* rehearing en banc: 'The right to permission fees is precisely what is at issue here. It is circular to argue that a use is unfair, and a fee is therefore, required, on the bases that the publisher is otherwise deprived of a fee' (*Princeton, supra* note 22, p. 1407). In reply, the majority in *Princeton* contended that the market harm factor is restricted to traditional, reasonable, or likely-to-be developed markets and held the licensing market to be such a "protectable derivative market", the destruction of which is certain when circumvention of the plaintiff's permission fee system is authorized (*Princeton, supra* note 22, p. 1386–1387, quoting *American Geophysical, supra* note 21). On circularity, see Loren (1997, at p. 34): '[. . .] there is always the potential for a market because the law can define a right, thus creating the market' This discussion somehow clouds the one correct interpretation of the market harm test embodied in the fourth factor of 107, as endorsed by the Supreme Court in both *Sony* and *Harper & Row* "To negate fair use, one need only show that if the challenged use should become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for copyrighted work." (Harper and Row, 471 U.S., p. 568, quoting *Sony*, 464 U.S., p. 451.)
25. See *American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.*, *supra* note 21, p. 931.
26. A claim that is peculiar perhaps in another sense: as the rights of copyright owners expand, which they indeed have over the past few decades, one would expect the importance of fair use to grow (Loren, 1997, p. 22, at footnote 91).
27. Kitch (2000), distinguishes between a structural and transactional version of this argument, see *supra* note 2.
28. See *supra* note 2. Where a use is considered 'fair' because there is no effective way to obtain a license to use, there is some merit in the argument that the logistical advancements of the Internet will reduce the number of successful fair-use defenses. To argue that it will bring the end of the doctrine of fair use, however, is a statement of a different magnitude.
29. This argument should not be confused with the current debate related to the scope of copyright protection for digital content on the Internet. For a discussion of recent developments in Internet-specific fair use, see, e.g., Ginsburg (2000) and Okediji (2001).



30. The Clinton Administration's Working Group on Intellectual Property of the Information Infrastructure Task Force proposes amendments to the U.S. Copyright Act based on surveys of how intellectual property will interact with the new digital media, such as the Internet. The NII White paper is the working group's final report.
31. The NII White paper can be found on line at <<<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/index.html>>> (last visited on 08/31/00). From the legislative contingent, the National Information Infrastructure Copyright Protection Act (NIICPA) has gone further and recommends changes to the 1976 Copyright Act to protect and encourage ARM systems. S. 1284 4 (proposed 1202(c) of the Copyright Act); H.R. 2441 4, 104th Cong. (1995), cited in Bell (1998, p. 572).
32. On the other hand, bargaining costs between parties might actually be higher in cyberspace, see Merges, *supra* note 2, p. 116.
33. "Permission systems" ignore one of the purposes of the fair-use doctrine: 'to permit uses whose external benefits outweigh any perceived damage to the creators incentive to create, regardless of whether the copyright owner would like to be paid for a particular use, and regardless of whether the copyright owner has established a system to collect such payments'. Loren (1997, p. 48).
34. See Loren (1997, *supra* note 2, pp. 52–53).
35. On subsidies and intellectual property, see Merges (1997, *supra* note 2, pp. 133–134).
36. Gordon (1982, p. 1628).
37. In this use of the term, transaction costs are similar to transportation costs in international commerce, and often constitute a simple (yet, unavoidable) barrier to potential value-enhancing exchanges. Elsewhere, Gordon remarks that 'bargaining may be exceedingly expensive, or it may be impractical to obtain enforcement against non-purchasers, or other market flaws might preclude achievement of desirable consensual exchanges' (Gordon, 1982, p. 1617).
38. *Id.*, *supra*, p. 1630.
39. *Id.*, *supra*, p. 1634.
40. Cautioning that fair use should not be granted, regardless of possible advancements in technology, Gordon suggests that the 'transaction costs to obtain permission to use certain materials might be prohibitively high at one point in time, yet in some circumstances a clearinghouse system might be set up to simplify the process of purchasing permission, and thus allow a market to function' (Gordon, 1982, p. 1620).
41. The Internet-based reduction of transaction costs is simply a overextended version of this argument. The transaction-reductive effect of clearinghouses are similar to the meeting point between copyright holder and user provided by the Internet.
42. Merges (1997, p. 133), citing Merges (1994), dealing with 'bargaining breakdown in one-shot, as opposed to repeat-play, intellectual property rights transactions'. Curiously enough Merges is very much on point in the general 'transaction costs in cyberspace' debate. See Merges (1997, p. 116), distinguishing search-, information-, measurement- and enforcement-costs to conclude that 'cyberspace does not appear to lower negotiation costs in most cases'. Still, examining *American Geophysical*, he reserves only a limited role for the market failure rationale in the future of fair use.

43. Heller (1997) recently revitalized the concept in an article on the transition to market institutions in contemporary Russia. He discusses the intriguing prevalence of empty storefronts in Moscow, which are subject to underuse because there are too many players (local, regional and federal government agencies, mafia, etc.) holding the right to prevent their use.
44. Note that these negative externalities are present in both horizontal relationships, where both complementary inputs are situated at the same stage in the production process and in vertical relationships, in which inputs are acquired and utilized sequentially. An example of the latter is the radio broadcaster who needs to obtain a license from the broadcasting authorities, copyright, and performing rights holders. Acquisition of each licence is a prerequisite for further development of the activity. For a formal distinction between horizontal and vertical anticommons settings, see Parisi et al. (2000).
45. One neat point worth noting is that the situation in which each of two copyright holders can separately license would create a Bertrand duopoly, unless they can agree to joint forces and act as a single monopolist.
46. We discuss, among other parameters, the ambiguous effects of the recent antitrust rulings that require copyright owners to retain the ability to issue licenses (“direct licences”) for their work, whereby potential licensees can choose to contract directly with the author, allowing for potential competition between owners and intermediaries. In the “complements” instance, the intermediary creates a coordinated pricing equilibrium from which owners have no incentive to deviate because they would not be able to sell for more than the “collectives” equilibrium price and, given the complementarity of the licenses, they have no reason to sell for less. The competition between source and intermediary licenses would thus have no effect on the equilibrium price, rendering ineffective the provisions of the consent decrees on this point. In the case of “substitutes” each copyright owner will have an incentive to lower the price (or increase the quantity) of the supplied licenses, deviating unilaterally from the coordinated pricing equilibrium that the intermediary creates, which preempt the oligopolistic competition of the individual sellers. We also discuss ASCAPs and other comparable performance right organizations practice of offering blanket licenses (covering the right to perform the collective’s entire repertory) and, to a small extent, per-program licenses (a blanket license that covers use of the repertory in a specific radio or television program, while requiring the user to keep track of all use). This is quite understandable in light of the above analysis. Although, tying all licenses together allows copyright collectives to shield their market power from the potential competition of individual licenses, it has opposite effects from an efficiency point of view. (In the “complements” case, it prevents the tragic outcome of anticommons pricing; in the “substitutes” case, however, it has the effect of preventing desirable competition.) See Depoorter and Parisi (2001).
47. In response to increasing antitrust concerns by courts about the monopolistic powers of ASCAP within the music industry, a consent decree was issued, see *United States v. ASCAP* (*United States v. ASCAP*, 1940–1943) Trade Cas. (CCH) 56, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). A new consent decree was recently proposed. See <<<http://www.ascap.com/press/afj2final.pdf>>> (last visited November 22, 2000). Antitrust constraints thus prevents copyright collectives from conducting first or second degree price discrimination

between licensees that are similarly situated (ASCAP, for instance does not price discriminate in license rates, terms or conditions between similarly situated users).

48. For further reference see <http://www.ascap.com> (last visited November 20, 2000). In an amendment to the original consent decree, the Department of Justice assigned the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, to adjudicate disputes on what constitutes a “reasonable fee” (*United States v. ASCAP*, 1950–1951) Trade Cas. (CCH) 62, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). More recently, the Sensenberger Amendment, attached to the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, allows non-broadcasters to initiate less cost intensive binding arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration Society (Sec. 203. H.AMDT. 532, amendment to H.R. 2589), 105th Cong. (1998), available on <http://thomas.loc.gov> (last visited November 20, 2000).
49. Bundling and price coordination is always in the interest of those who have control over these practices (sellers), even though this may not always create desirable equilibria for society at large. This, in turn, generates a pooling equilibrium which prevents us from using revealed preferences to distinguish between the two hypotheses.

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