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**Beat Fux**

## **Which Models of the Family are Encouraged or Discouraged by Different Family Policies?**

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## Table of Contents

Summary .....	1
1. Introduction .....	2
2. An approach to analyse the potential impacts of family policies .....	5
3. Description of inter-country heterogeneity with regard to selected family policy measures .....	11
4. Towards a typology of family policy regimes in selected European countries .....	18
5. Interrelations between the economic situation, family related values, and family policy regimes.....	21
6. Hypotheses on the potential impact of family policy measures on family-types and family life.....	27
6.1 Family policy and its impact on the temporal organisation of the family cycle 27	
6.2 Family policy and its impact on the spread of new living-arrangements 29	
6.3 Family policy and its impact on female labour force participation 31	
6.4 Family policy and its impact on reproductive behaviour 38	
7. Conclusion and outlook .....	39
8. Bibliography .....	41

## Figures

Figure 1 Two types of policy impact models .....	6
A) Causal Impact Model: .....	6
B) Model of dynamic interdependencies: .....	6
Figure 2 Resources-Restriction-Behaviour Model on Potential Family Policy Impact.....	8
Figure 3 Social security expenditure as a percentage of GDP per capita 1990...	23
Figure 4 Family cash benefits and family services expenditure as a percentage of GDP per capita, 1990.....	23
Figure 5 Hypothetical end empirical paces of female labour force inte- gration by regime-type .....	35
Figure 6 Reconciling of employment and the family in selected European countries, women 20-44 (around 1991) .....	38
Figure 7 Summary of hypothetical family policy impacts .....	40

## Tables

Table 1 Family allowances as of 1989 in selected European countries (Standardised amounts and percentage of average male wages in manufacturing). 11	
Table 2 Maternity and child-care leave scheme as of 1990 in selected European countries .....	13
Table 3 Public provisions of child-care as of 1988 in selected European countries .....	15
Table 4 Heterogeneities in the tax systems in selected European countries .....	17
Table 5 Summary table on preferred interventions according to regime type .....	18
Table 6 Correlations, factor matrix, and factor scores of a Principal Compo- nent Analysis for nine welfare and family policy variables .....	19
Table 7 Family related values and attitudes in selected European countries around 1990 .....	24
Table 8 Correlations, rotated factor matrix, and factor scores of a Principal Component Analysis for seven attitudinal variables.....	25
Table 9 Correlation between family policy regimes (factor scores) and value dimensions (factor scores).....	26
Table 10 Living arrangements of women in early parental phase by family policy regime, late 1980s.....	31



## **Which models of the family are en- or discouraged by different family policies?**

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### ***Summary***

This chapter focuses on potential effects and impact mechanisms of family related policies on the behaviour of individuals and couples. Firstly, with the diagnosis that only limited progress in this field of research can be expected, the relevant causes in this connection are investigated. Two analytical impact models, namely the causal interpretation of policy effects vs. a model of dynamic interdependencies are then contrasted. By preferring the latter model, this article aims at systematising the potential impact areas. On the basis of a description of inter-country heterogeneity regarding the family policies during the late 1980s in ten European countries, a typology of three different family policy regimes is proposed; namely the etatistic, the familialistic, and the individualistic regime type which are characterised by particular patterns in the preferred forms of political intervention. Based on empirical analyses, evidence is presented for relevant interrelations between the economic situation, family related values, and these policy regimes. According to these analyses selected impact hypotheses were analysed relating to a) the temporal organisation of the family cycle, b) the spread of new living-arrangements, c) female labour force participation as well as d) procreative behaviour.

## 1. Introduction

In the course of the past three decades, the traditional family has undergone several transformations. The fertility decline, the development and spread of new living-arrangements, increasing divorce rates, and female labour force participation were predominant subjects of scientific research. The particular focus of this project was put on collecting comparative data for a sample of European countries which considered changes of family structures, everyday life of families, and family policies during the 1980s (Kaufmann et al. 1997). The information collected in this context may be a useful supplement to other demographic sources (e.g. from EUROSTAT, ILO, Council of Europe, ECE) in order to provide a summary of basic changes of the family, and family related policies from a comparative perspective.

The most important finding is, undoubtedly, that during this period new family forms were entering into competition with the bourgeois type of family (Parsons' „normal" family) and its predetermined division of labour between gender (breadwinner - homemaker model of the family). However, there is little evidence that in any European country the bourgeois family type and corresponding value orientations (familialism, value of children) will fade out or even disappear. Particularly, during the early parental phase, the traditional pattern of marriage-based living-arrangements with a gendered role-setting retained its relevance in quantitative terms (number of occurrences) as well as in the sense of a frame of individual orientations. However, the dissemination of alternative living-arrangements such as unmarried cohabitations, single-parent-hood, childlessness or living apart together, and the legitimacy of these modern family types vary significantly from country to country.

In the face of these changes, increasing priority has been given to questions like: What is, could be, and should be the role of the state in the field of family related policies? Do different forms of support provided to the family have impacts on families and their everyday life? What are the mechanisms of potential impacts? Although such queries have led to many scientific studies and surveys on family policy matters, only limited progress in this field can be registered. In particular, hardly any direct causal effects of particular benefits and provisions for families could be detected or even quantified.

At least three reasons are important for the limited knowledge on these topics: (i) Family policy refers to an *over-complex system* of interdependencies in which three subsystems: namely, individuals, families, and the state are involved in multiple ways (Herlth and Kaufmann 1982). This leads to a bulk of *methodological problems* which cannot easily be solved in an appropriate way.

A few challenging issues are (a) The lack of *strictly comparative information* on family related policies.<sup>1</sup> Difficulties are also related to the fact that beside universal benefits there exist also means-tested, tax-related, as well as private (occupational) benefits to which often only specific sub-groups of the population are entitled. The analysis of potential effects therefore has to distinguish between different types of recipients as well as between different living-arrangements because the relations between them might even be contrary;. (b) Missing *longitudinal individual-level data* intensify the micro-macro-problem. Though comparative large-scale surveys like the Family and Fertility Surveys (FFS) allow analysis of changes related to individual life-cycles, there exist hardly any data on corresponding changes in attitudes and value orientations; (c) The *problem of causality*: (i) available data do not allow, for example, decomposing overall statistical associations into selection effects and affirmation effects. (ii) Corresponding to the situation on the level of available data-sources and methodology, there is a lack in concise theorising. There exist firstly macroanalytical approaches comparing the effects of family policy expenditures on the distribution of selected family-forms or demographic indicators (TFR, births out-of-wedlock, labour force participation, etc.; cf. Ekert 1986; Blanchet and Ekert-Jaffé 1988; Huber and Stephens 1992; Gauthier 1991, 1993). However, they often neglect the interests and intentions of individual actors or specific sub-groups of the population. Secondly, there are economic theories (New Home Economics, rational-choice), which mostly focus on the concept of the costs of children (Becker 1991; Friedman et al. 1994). Even if arguing from a microanalytical perspective, they often tend to overemphasise the dimension of economic rationality, dealing with children as if they were just consumer goods. A third group of theories, like Caldwell's wealth-flows theory (Caldwell 1982), Esping-Andersen's comparative study on „The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” (Esping-Andersen 1990), micro-simulations carried out by Kaufmann and his collaborators (Kaufmann et al. 1988, 1992), or generalised rational-choice approaches (Cliquet et al. 1992; de Bruijn 1992, 1993; Fux et al. 1993, Fux 1994) made attempts to catch up on these arrears. However, some of these proposals are not explicitly devoted to family policy, but to welfare policies in a much broader sense and need, therefore, further elaboration. (iii) Beside the above-mentioned difficulties, any com-

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<sup>1</sup> In recent years, several joint-venture research projects made attempts to improve this situation on the base of different approaches. These were (1) the descriptive and analytical studies of the European Family Observatory, (2) the international database on population related policies provided by UN-ECE, which gives a very detailed picture of the situation around 1990, (3) the Population Policy Acceptance Project, which focuses on the evaluation of political incentives by individuals and couples, or (4) the forthcoming Family Policy Database compiled by the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research which will provide historical data on the development of particular family related policies.

parative study on potential effects of family policies has to take into account the peculiarities of countries concerning the trajectories and the present state of their economy, their cultural tradition, as well as their family policy system.

On the background of this confused situation, one cannot expect from this paper a well-founded answer to the question: Whether particular models, and which models of the family are encouraged or discouraged by different family policies? The objective here is two-fold: (i) to review the family policy systems in the countries participating in the project during the late 1980s in order to (a) cluster national units according to their family policy strategies; and (b) compare national family policy systems with the distribution of value-orientations and attitudes. Such a comparison is based on the idea that the implementation of national family policies are the effect of a „dialogue“ between governmental and individual actors rather than the causal dependency of the behaviour of individuals and families from the political interests of their governments; (ii) The second part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of particular associations between three clusters of national family policies and corresponding behavioural outcomes (e.g. family structures, family life). I fully agree with the warning mentioned by Palomba and her colleagues in their country report „to use prudence in evaluating the effects of political actions and measures in the familial field, or in reducing them to the demographic environment alone“ (Menniti et al. 1997: 235). To avoid inconclusive results, hypotheses are formulated on the potential impact of family policy that might be tested on the basis of adequate data rather than to venture affirmative propositions on interdependencies or even causal relations.

The paper is divided into seven sections. In the following part, a brief discussion of the *theoretical approach* guide-lining the following analyses. In section three, some *inter-country comparisons* on selected family policy measures will be presented. Then attempts are made to cluster these measures in order to define a *typology* of different family policy regimes among the countries participating in this project (section four). These regimes shall then be applied to their *economic situation* and the distribution of *family related attitudes* (section five). In section six, specific *impact hypotheses* are formulated and discussed on the background of data collected in the first phase of the project. Finally, the paper concludes by *summarising* the main results and by suggesting some proposals for further research (section seven).

To reduce the complexity of the question under observation, this paper does not discuss trends or developments in the field of family related policies but focuses only on family policy in a narrow sense. All analyses in the ten countries participating in this project will focus the situation around 1990. For certain analyses, it will be necessary either not to divide Germany into the former FRG and the former GDR, or to exclude the new Bundesländer from the analyses. This contribution is far from being exhaustive. Nevertheless, it aims to provide inspiration for further research in this field.



## 2. An approach to analyse the potential impacts of family policies

Generally, we can distinguish two types of family policy impact models (Fig. 1 A and B). The *causal interpretation* assumes that a government is implementing a certain family policy in order to directly influence the behaviour of families and/or individuals. Such a perspective is chosen by many macro-sociological and demographic approaches not least due to the lack of appropriate individual level data. In this case, human behaviour is considered as determined by external factors, mainly by the interest of governmental actors and their corresponding policies. The pitfall of such an „etic“ perspective can be seen in the fact that the precondition of a strong and relatively independent central government is seen only in a restricted number of countries (e.g. the socialist countries or social-democratic regimes like the Scandinavian countries which are historically influenced by strong Protestant state churches). This type of explanation has further methodological shortcomings. Firstly, it has been argued that governmental acting frequently produces “*unintended consequences*” rather than causal effects. Secondly, causal models often do not allow for description of the *individual-level mechanisms* leading to a certain outcome. An exception in this prospect is the micro-economics theory of fertility (New Home Economics). Since their arguments are centred around the concept of the cost of children, they focus on potential pronatalistic effects. Thirdly, causal models are based on well-defined relations between actors and behavioural outcome (for example: couples lead to reproductive behaviour). *Differential effects* for certain time-periods, or for some sub-groups, as well as *indirect effects* seem often to be neglected.


On reviewing this type of academic literature, one can say that most authors mention severe doubts whether family policy has a direct quantitative long-term impact on individual behaviour. Höhn and Schubnell, for example, qualify the French pronatalist family policy as relatively ineffective: “France is the classical example for an embracing, continuous, and explicitly pronatalist policy. Nevertheless, calculations of the long-term effects estimates an impact of only 0.2 to 0.3 additional children in relation to the average number of children of French female generations.” (Höhn and Schubnell 1986: 3, translated from German).

A second type of impact model (dynamic interdependencies) considers human behaviour as *in-deterministic*. Similar to rational choice approaches, personal interests, preferences, and intentions cannot be explained nor predicted in a strict sense. The government as well as families and individuals are considered here as institutions embedded in a network of interdependent relations. Both actors evaluate societal processes and have to react on each others’ demands. In this view, family policy is much more the result of a complex trade-off (conflict management) between subsystems, which takes into account external factors


(e.g. the economy, history and traditions, and the distribution of values), as well as, the outcome of earlier activities (evaluation). From this perspective, the government is characterised as an institution, moderating between different other actors. Since this model supposes a “discourse” or “dialogue” between different actors, one should avoid a terminology suggesting causal effects. I therefore prefer to speak about interdependencies stimulating (encouraging) or preventing (discouraging) a certain behavioural outcome. A methodological limitation of the model of dynamic interdependencies lies furthermore in its complexity that makes it difficult or even impossible to operationalise particular effects and impact mechanisms.

Figure 1 Two types of policy impact models

A) Causal Impact Model:



B) Model of dynamic interdependencies:



In view of these difficulties, reference is made to *rational choice theory*, which at present is the dominant approach in models of decision-making. The approach can be connected with selected aspects deriving from the second type of impact model. The general idea is quite simple. The government, just as families and individuals, is considered to be a rational actor. A *government* (in this paper policies of other actors such as sub-national units, voluntary associations, organisations etc, are not taken into account) provides different forms (legal,


economical, and ecological) of *interventions* addressed to various *family types*. It refers to the background of (i) the *economic* and *cultural* situation of a country and also considers (ii) the *demands* of the population. With *political strategies* the government generally intends either a *reduction of restrictions, barriers and thresholds* families are confronted with, or to *stimulate certain outcomes*. Whether a government puts an observable restriction on its political agenda, and which policies it provides depends not least on external factors (economy, tradition, political culture, values, etc.).

Individuals and couples can be also characterised as rational actors. According to neo-classical economic theories, the individual is defined as an utility maximizer ("Homo Economicus"). It "displays a kind of behaviour directed by deliberate and calculative evaluation of alternatives, and the subsequent choice is the best course of action to achieve a clearly defined end" (de Bruijn 1992: 5). Sociologists in contrast to economists designed a much broader concept of rationality ("rationality from the point of view of the actor", cf. Coleman 1990: 18) by providing some contextual body and stressing the procedures of decision making. In this sense, rationality refers to free choice within the limits of the cognitive capacities and the social environment of an individual or a couple. This concept provides a framework of means and ends concurrent with the procedures that manage attention and generate the subjective perception of this framework. Furthermore, it provides the reasoning processes that allow people to judge possible behaviour, explicitly taking into account the effect of ignorance, uncertainty and decision costs in terms of time, energy and emotional stress (according to de Bruijn 1992: 14).

In other words, in order to obtain satisfying behaviour, individuals and couples try to balance their limited resources (Cliquet distinguishes between biological, socio-psychological, economic, and socio-cultural resources, Cliquet et al. 1992: 30ff) and the behavioural outcome. Within such bargaining processes, individuals make their decisions by selecting options out of a spectrum of alternatives.

Family related policies might influence these processes by stimulating or preventing behavioural outcomes. One can say that the higher the restriction, barrier, or threshold on a certain dimension, the lower will be the propensity of individuals or couples to chose this option, and vice versa. Thus, the more a family related policy reduces a factual restriction, the higher is the probability that people will select the corresponding option, and the higher is the occurrence of a certain behavioural outcome. The argument is in essence a generalisation of the economic theory of fertility that assumes: the higher the cost of children, the lower will be the demand for children; and, by extension, the higher the level of cash benefits or maternity benefits the higher will be the demand for children since these benefits reduce the direct costs and/or the opportunity costs of children.

Figure 2 *Resources-Restriction-Behaviour Model on Potential Family Policy Impact*



Although the following analysis of family policy impacts shall be based on this approach, there are some limitations. On the background of aggregated data it is impossible to decide which part of the variance on a certain behavioural dimension is effected by specific political interventions and which part is the result of an individual's or couple's decisions on the background of its resources and values. In other words, by means of macro-indicators it is almost impossible to pinpoint individual-level mechanisms leading to a certain outcome. Correlations between such indicators may be, by consequence, the result of ecological failures.

The Resources-Restrictions-Behaviour Model refers to three actors which are involved in the formulation and execution of any family policy. In order to elaborate this approach countries are clustered in accordance with the predominant actors in this field, therefore to distinguish between (i) state-centred or etatistic, (ii) family-centred or familialistic, and (iii) individual-centred or individualistic regimes (Fux 1994; Fux et al. 1997; Dorbritz and Fux 1997).

The *etatistic regime* type is based on a strong central government which is legitimised to intervene in family related matters and which disposes of corresponding resources. Etatism aims particularly at supporting discriminated living-arrangements therefore creating an equalisation between different family forms and gender (social equality). Corresponding policies are characterised by a system of redistribution and by providing universalist services outside the market which are based on the principle of need.

Etatistic regimes are to be found in countries with a Protestant tradition (state-churches), where secularization and modernization processes developed early and were supported by social-democratic governments that explicitly intended to provide equal opportunities to all individuals. Assumed major consequences related to this regime-type are: (i) early participation of women in universal education and in the employment sector, (ii) openness and tolerance re-

garding different behaviours (including the acceptance of contraception, abortion, divorce), (iii) by consequence, the process of pluralisation of living arrangements was not hampered and could easily develop, (iv) in these countries, trend-breaks related to fertility occur earlier and tend also to react more sensitively on short and medium term period events (Hoffmann-Nowotny and Fux 2000).

In many aspects, the Eastern European countries show similar developments to the etatistic trajectory (e.g. female labour market integration, early development of family policy incentives). However, one has to take into account that economic conditions in the former socialist countries were comparatively bad. For women, employment was often not a means for self-fulfilment, but a mere economic necessity as well as being normatively expected. Although in most cases family policy offers were able to absorb some of the individual restrictions, the combination of work and family obligations was for women rather a dual burden than a real matter of choice. Furthermore, though the uses of contraceptives, abortion and divorce were societally legitimised as well as frequently practised, the link between family and marriage was comparatively closer than in the cluster of etatistic countries. Also the trend towards a pluralisation of living arrangements seems to be comparatively weaker. The former socialist countries perform, therefore, a relatively distinct pattern with only partial overlap with the etatistic cluster.

The *familialistic regime* type is characterised by a strong belief in the self-organising capacities of families. Kinship and the family are not only highly valued institutions but are seen as influential political actors. According to the concept of subsidiarity that derives from the Social-Catholic doctrine, the family plays an important role in conflict resolution and social integration and therefore needs to be supported (Schultheis 1988, cf. preface by F.-X. Kaufmann). By consequence, countries providing a familialistic policy belonged to the forerunners with regard to the establishment of (parity-specific) family and child allowances as well as in the field of public child-care institutions. The latter is due to the involvement of religious organisations in the child-care and educational system. Employment-related policies, by contrast, aiming at facilitating the labour force integration of women, or even more generally, equality-oriented policies are rather neglected, because the preferred role of women is that of homemakers and mothers.

Since the familialistic regime type is deeply rooted in Catholicism, it is to be observed mainly in countries with a Christian-democratic political culture, i.e. in the Northern and Southern European peripheries (Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy) but is also seen in francophone countries like France or Belgium as well as in Central European countries like Austria or the Catholic parts of Germany.

A third clearly distinguishable regime type consists of the traditionally liberal countries in Europe, particularly Great Britain and Switzerland. Since neither the Roman Catholic tradition, nor the central state gained much influence on

values and behaviours, this group can be characterised by a far-reaching policy of “laissez-faire“. According to Titmuss (1974) one can denominate this regime as the „The Residual Welfare Model of Social Policy“. A formulation which is based on the premise that there are two ‚natural‘ (or socially given) channels through which an individual’s needs are properly met; the private market and the family. Only when these break down should social welfare institutions come into play and then only temporarily. In other words, welfare and family policies are anchored in a secular interpretation of the concept of subsidiarity.

On the one side, these countries delegate family-related obligations to individuals or single couples. Therefore, this trajectory is named the *individualistic path*. In terms of family policy, these countries let observe either a political abstention in this respect, or, at least, no accentuated political preferences. Tolerance, as well as equality are value-orientations which rank highest in these countries. Behaviours can be characterised by the following indicators: (i) Regarding fertility, the trend towards a polarisation of behaviours (voluntary childlessness vs. being a parent) is stronger than in the other clusters; (ii) the propensity to postpone births is more accentuated; (iii) The process of female labour force participation commenced later and more hesitatingly; (iv) Because of the obligation to self-organise the reconciliation of work and the family, these countries show more frequently a bipolar distribution in the age-specific employment rates (baby-break and re-entry); (v) Although the proportions of consensual unions are lower than in the Scandinavian countries, they do increase and influence the process of pluralisation; (vi) However, the experience of parenthood more frequently motivates couples to transform their relation into a marital union. Therefore, marriage tends to have an instrumental function. Often people marry just for clarifying the legal status of one’s partner or child.

Before attempting to test these assumed regime types empirically, inter-country differences are described with regard to selected family policy measures focusing mainly on four types of intervention: (i) family allowances, (ii) maternity and child-care leave schemes, (iii) public child-care provisions, and (iv) tax allowances. The general assumption is that within etatistic regimes we can find well-developed maternity leave schemes and child-care provisions (they allow women to reconcile work and family and follow the norm of gender equality). Familialistic regimes prefer high allowances, especially for children of higher parity, since their prior interest is to balance the financial situation between parents and single persons. Countries with an individualistic regime are ranking lowest on most of these interventions. Because they define family policy as a private matter they show smallest family policy expenditures and by consequence, lowest taxes used for financing their family policy.

### 3. Description of inter-country heterogeneity with regard to selected family policy measures

Obviously, it is not easy to present fully comparable data on family policy measures. Economic provisions differ in many details and definitions. Furthermore, the only allowances taken into account here are those provided by the government. *Table 1* shows the standardised amount (based on parity purchasing power indices) of family allowances for two and three-child-families as well as the percentage of these allowances in relation to the average male wages in manufacturing in 1989.

Sweden (and Eastern Germany) provide the highest allowances. Regarding the average income of the family, France ranks higher than Sweden and by reference to a three-child-family it clearly lies in pole-position. Although this corresponds to the above-mentioned assumptions, one has to state that neither Italy nor Ireland (both are considered as familialistic regimes) show substantive allowances, even if at least Italy provides parity-specific allowances (cf. Menniti et al. 1997, Appendix A). Probably due to their economic position they rank lowest together with countries with individualistic regimes.

*Table 1* Family allowances as of 1989 in selected European countries (Standardised amounts and percentage of average male wages in manufacturing)

Country	2-child family		3-child family	
	US\$ Rank	% Rank	US\$ Rank	% Rank
<b>Denmark</b>	88.4 (4)	6.7 (4)	132.6 (6)	10.0 (4)
<b>France</b> *	76.7 (6)	7.4 (2)	175.0 (2)	16.9 (1)
<b>Germany (W)</b> * <sup>1</sup>	62.2 (7)	4.3 (8)	153.5 (4)	10.5 (3)
<b>Germany (E)</b> * <sup>2</sup>	.	[11.4] (1)	.	.
<b>Ireland</b>	39.8 (8)	2.8 (9)	59.6 (8)	4.2 (8)
<b>Italy</b> * <sup>3</sup>	13.5 (9)	1.0 (10)	53.9 (9)	4.0 (9)
<b>Netherlands</b> *	101.3 (2)	6.2 (6)	162.9 (3)	10.0 (4)
<b>Sweden</b> *	104.8 (1)	6.9 (3)	183.9 (1)	12.1 (2)
<b>Switzerland</b> * <sup>4</sup>	77.9 (5)	4.8 (7)	120.9 (7)	7.4 (7)
<b>United Kingdom</b>	100.7 (3)	6.3 (5)	151.1 (5)	9.5 (6)

*Sources:* Commission of the European Communities: Comparative Tables of the Social Security Schemes, Brussels; Council of Europe: Comparative Tables of the Social Security Schemes, Strasbourg; compilation by Gauthier 1993: 21.

Values in US dollars have been calculated on the basis of parity purchasing power indices; Values in percentage have been calculated by reference to the average male wages in manufacturing.

*Notes:* (\*) Countries, where family allowances vary according to the birth order of the child.

(Notes continued)

- (1) The amount indicated is the maximum received by a family whose income does not exceed the threshold (above this threshold the allowances paid are gradually reduced).
- (2) In 1988 family allowances in the former GDR run up to 50 Mark for the first child, 100 Mark for the second and 150 Mark for children of higher parity. Minima for fully employed mothers with two children: 250 Mark, with three children 350 Mark. The net income of a family with two earners amounts to about 2'185 Mark per month (Source: Wendt 1993: 15f).
- (3) Data used here refer to the amount received by a family with an income equal to that of an average worker in manufacturing (family allowances for first child = 0; second child = 20'000 Lira/month; third child = 60'000 Lira/month).
- (4) Parity specific allowances are known only in 9 cantons. Since family allowances in Switzerland are under cantonal law, the figures are weighted (number of children entitled to allowances) means.

In *Table 2* the duration of maternity and (paid or unpaid) child-care leaves are listed. Since many countries provide no full wage replacement during maternity leave, an Index was built in order to make data comparable.

Evidently countries assigned to the etatistic regime type (Eastern European and Scandinavian countries are leaders in the field of social services addressed to families. There are marked differences between the former GDR, Sweden, and Denmark as well as between this group and most other countries under observation. Outliers on the bottom are the individualistic states (Switzerland, UK, and Ireland). In contrast to the familialistic regimes, none of them provides paid child-care leave.

In line with their emancipation policy doctrine, etatistic countries prefer maternity leave schemes rather than child-care-leave schemes. At least if maternity leave is linked with job guarantees it may contribute to the conciliation of occupation and the family. The difference in strategy becomes evident by taking into account that in most cases only women (F, FRG, I) are entitled to take child-care leave or that this intervention is restricted to a mere legal intervention (no payment guarantees).

Regarding these two measures the different optics amongst etatistic, familialistic, and individualistic regimes are rather obvious. Nevertheless, it would be useful to analyse detailed differences in the definition of such measures with qualitative methods.



Table 2 Maternity and child-care leave scheme as of 1990 in selected European countries

Country	Perinatal maternity leave			Child-care leave			(un)paid optional leave
	weeks	% of wages <sup>1</sup>	Index <sup>2</sup>	Rank	months <sup>3</sup>	Rank <sup>15</sup>	
<b>Denmark</b> *	28	90	25.2	(3)	10	(7)	paid
<b>France</b> * <sup>4</sup>	16	84	13.4	(7)	36 <sup>5</sup>	(1)	paid
<b>Germany (W)</b> *	14	100	14.0	(6)	18 <sup>6</sup>	(2)	paid
<b>Germany (E)</b> * <sup>7</sup>	78	100	78.0	(1)	18	(2)	paid
<b>Ireland</b> * <sup>8</sup>	14	70	9.8	(8)	5.5	(9)	unpaid
<b>Italy</b>	22	80	17.6	(4)	12 <sup>9</sup>	(4)	paid
<b>Netherlands</b>	16	100	16.0	(5)	6 <sup>10</sup>	(8)	unpaid
<b>Sweden</b> * <sup>11</sup>	65	74	48.1	(2)	18 <sup>12</sup>	(5)	unpaid
<b>Switzerland</b> * <sup>13</sup>	8	100	8.0	(10)	4	(10)	unpaid
<b>United Kingdom</b> * <sup>14</sup>	18	45	8.1	(9)	10	(6)	unpaid

Sources: Gauthier 1993:22f and 1996:178; Schunter-Kleemann 1992:141ff; Wendt 1993:17.

Notes: (\*) In these countries, the eligibility of maternity benefits is conditional to the employment status and/or the previous social insurance contribution of the woman.

- (1) Corresponds to the amount of benefits as a percentage of the regular wages.
- (2) Index of the maternity leave benefit, resulting from the multiplication of the number of weeks of leave by the wage replacement rate.
- (3) Refer to the period during which mothers (and fathers in some cases) can be absent from work in connection with childbirth. In DK, NL, S, and CH, the duration includes the period covered by the paid maternity leave, in the other countries, the duration starts after the compulsory maternity leave. During this period, parents are protected against dismissal.
- (4) Since 1980 the duration of the maternity leave for the third and subsequent children is 26 weeks instead of 16 weeks for the first two children.
- (5) Only women with three or more children are entitled to the child-care benefits. On the other hand, all women are entitled to an unpaid leave until the child's third birthday.
- (6) Flat rate benefits are paid to women during the first six months of the leave. Thereafter, benefits are means-tested.
- (7) Paid pregnancy leave (Schwangerschaftsurlaub): 6 weeks before the birth. Paid maternity leave (Wochenurlaub): 20 weeks. Paid baby-year after the „Wochenurlaub“ until the first birthday of the child: 52 weeks (To this benefit were entitled the mother, the father and under certain circumstances even the grandmother of the child. Duration of the baby-year for the third child: 78 weeks, for twins: 104 weeks and triple births 156 weeks).
- (8) From 1981 to 1991, an additional (general) scheme was in force which provided women with flat rate benefits during a 12-week leave.

- (9) Women are entitled to a one-year leave. Benefits equivalent to 30% of previous earnings are paid during six months.
- (10) The leave can only be taken on a part-time basis (with a minimum of 20 hours of work per week) before the child reaches 4 years old. This scheme excludes the period covered by the paid maternity leave.
- (11) Parents are entitled to 12 months of leave during which the parent on leave receives benefits equal to 90% of her/his previous earnings. A flat rate benefit is paid during the following 3 months, and represents around 10% of female wages in manufacturing. Overall, this is equivalent to 15 months of leave at 74% of previous earnings.
- (12) This leave is under labour law and is independent of the maternity/parental leave scheme. It gives parents the opportunity to take an unpaid leave until the child reaches 18 months. Parents can then decide to prolong this leave with the paid parental leave (which unlike other countries is not tied to the immediate period surrounding childbirth, but can be taken until the child reaches 18 months).
- (13) By legislation there is a compulsory 8-week leave after confinement. There is however no national regulation concerning the pay during this leave. Depending on the collective agreement, benefits are paid for between 3 to 8 weeks at full wage. Mothers insured under a health insurance scheme (this is valid for most women) are entitled to sick pay for a total of 10 weeks. For the purpose of this paper, it was assumed that women are entitled to 8 weeks of leave during which they receive 100% of their previous earnings.
- (14) The value of maternity benefits paid varies according to the duration of employment and number of hours worked. Data used here refer to a woman having worked full-time at least two years in the same employment. The benefits paid for the first six weeks are equal to 90% of her previous earnings, while the following 12 weeks are paid at a flat rate representing around 25% of the female wages in manufacturing. Overall, this is equivalent to 18 weeks paid at 45% of previous earnings. Changes to the scheme have recently been announced following the EC directive on maternity (adopted 12 October 1992).
- (15) For comparing this measure (rankings) the figures of countries providing paid optional leave are weighted by factor 2.

In *Table 3* the percentages of children below age three and between three and school age enrolled in public funded institutions are given. Provisions for the youngest children are a supplementary instrument to parental leave. Therefore, one can assume that the structure will be similar to those in *Table 2*. Eastern Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and France rank highest on this dimension. All other countries show figures under 5%. Firstly, because of this rather extreme frequency distribution and secondly because of the country-specific existence of private day-care institutions, these figures should not be over-interpreted.

Regarding the enrolment rate of children aged three to school-age there are similar problems. Five out of ten countries show figures higher than 80%. In Western Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands the rate varies between 50% and 65%. For Switzerland, valid figures on a national level do not exist up to present. According to estimations the number is similar to UK.

Table 3. Public provisions of child-care as of 1988 in selected European countries

Country	age of the child			
	<3	Rank	3 to school age	Rank
<b>Denmark</b> <sup>1</sup>	50	(2)	>85	(3)
<b>France</b>	20	(4)	>95	(2)
<b>Germany (W)</b> <sup>2</sup>	5	(5)	65	(6)
<b>Germany (E)</b>	80	(1)	100	(1)
<b>Ireland</b>	3	(9)	55	(7)
<b>Italy</b> <sup>3</sup>	5	(5)	>85	(3)
<b>Netherlands</b>	<5	(7)	50	(8)
<b>Sweden</b> <sup>2</sup>	30	(3)	80	(5)
<b>Switzerland</b> <sup>4</sup>	2	(10)	.	.
<b>United Kingdom</b>	<5	(7)	35	(9)

Children enrolled in publicly funded day-care institutions as a percentage of the population under school age. Those figures include both part-time and full-time care, as well as subsidized family home-care, and pre-primary school-institutions.

Sources: Moss 1990; Nordic Council (ed.): Yearbook of Nordic Statistics (var. years); OECD: Child-care in OECD countries; Employment outlook, July 1990: 123-151; Gauthier 1993: 24; Wendt 1993: 95; Eidg. Kommission für Frauenfragen 1992; Lohkamp-Himmighofen 1994: 9.

Notes: (1) 1989 figures. (2) 1987 figures. (3) 1986 figures. (4) 1990 figures.

In conclusion, in countries with an individualistic regime the enrolment-rate is significantly lower. This is not necessarily the result of missing opportunities. One could argue that in these states people more often use private arrangements (e.g. grand-parents, day-care mothers). Between the etatistic and the familialistic regime, in particular child-care enrolment ratios for children below the age of three differ significantly, while public child-caring for older children is relatively accepted also in the familialistic countries. This corresponds with the ideology of the mother's indispensability during the early childhood.

Tax-systems of European countries can hardly be compared, although fiscal policy is perceived as an important family policy instrument. Data in Table 4, focuses on organisational information rather than on the amount of rebates, relief or other financial incentives. Besides these basics (tax unit, standard relief, equalisation), average level of earnings and the average effective tax rates have been compiled. Considering the hypothesis according to which countries representing an individualistic regime would delegate family policy tasks to couples or individuals, it is assumed these cases have a markedly higher income after deduction of taxes.

Within the group of familialistic countries the tax unit is the family while in both other regime types the fiscal unit is the individual. An exception is Italy. Until 1977 in Italy knew a family taxation while actually the units for taxation

are individuals. The second outlayer is Germany. Although the family is the relevant unit, the income of married couples is split. The third exception is Switzerland where there exist various cantonal heterogeneities in the taxation systems (for more details cf. Fux 1994: 362). In conclusion, these results are in line with the above-mentioned hypothesis.

Furthermore, the table shows that only in the Scandinavian countries married and unmarried couples are, in most aspects, treated equally. This fact can be explained by their doctrine of an emancipation policy in states moving toward an embracing family policy one can find at least a partial equalisation between these living-arrangements.

The effective average tax rates in relation to the level of earnings support these assumptions. There are three levels that correspond at least in so far as the proposed regime typology, as tax rates are obviously highest in the *etatistic* countries (Scandinavia). However, since taxation is interrelated with a country's economic power, tax rates don't fit as perfectly as within the two other regime types. Effective average tax rates are considerably lower than theoretically expected in countries like Germany, but higher than expected e.g. in the United Kingdom (UK).

Section 5 verifies the overall social security expenditures as well as the maternity and family expenditures in relation to the GDP p.c., in order to support these rather rough results with macro-sociological evidence.

*Table 5* summarises the major findings. It is hypothesised that countries with an *etatistic* regime clearly prefer ecological interventions. This fact might be explained by their doctrine to support emancipation interests of women. In these countries, (i) the amount of family allowances is markedly higher, but with a smaller progression of benefits in relation to children's parity, (ii) The duration of their maternity leave schemes is longer, and they prefer a parental leave rather than a child-care leave to which only women are entitled to, (iii) since these measures are expensive they require higher taxes from their citizens (by controlling the economic situation in terms of GDP p.c.).

Table 4. Heterogeneities in the tax systems in selected European countries

Country	Tax units for earned income 1990	Standard Reliefs for marriage in 1990	Standard Reliefs for dep. children	Equalisation of unmarr. couples ***	Level of Ear-nings: APW **	Effective Average Tax Rate ****
<b>Denmark</b>	Individual	Tax credit	No relief <sup>3</sup>	yes	18'709	35.6
<b>France</b>	Joint/family	Quotient	Quotient	partly	12'992	-
<b>Germany (W)</b>	Joint/family	Splitting	No relief <sup>3</sup>	no	18'120	9.2
<b>Germany (E)</b>	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Ireland</b>	Joint/family	Splitting	No relief <sup>3</sup>	no	14'939	17.0
<b>Italy</b>	Individual	Tax credit	Tax credit	no	15'054	14.8
<b>Netherlands</b>	Individual	Tax allowance <sup>2</sup>	No relief <sup>3</sup>	partly	18'052	9.1
<b>Sweden</b>	Individual *	Tax credit	-	yes	15'216	35.7
<b>Switzerland</b>	Joint/family <sup>1</sup>	Diff. schedules	Tax allowances <sup>4</sup>	no	20'083	5.8
<b>United Kingdom</b>	Individual *	Tax allowance <sup>2</sup>	No relief <sup>3</sup>	partly	18'682	15.6

Source: OECD (ed.): Taxation in OECD countries.

Notes: (\*) income from capital, land-ownership, or savings of spouses is not summed up.

(\*\*) APW = Level of Average Production Worker Earnings in 1989 (married couple with 2 children). Purchasing power parities (in US\$)

(\*\*\*) Assimilation of the legal status of married and unmarried couples in family and social law (source: Federkeil 1992).

(\*\*\*\*) Effective Average Tax Rates at the level of APW Earnings (married couple with 2 children). Excluding Non-standard reliefs, in 1989.

(1) At federal level; canton various. (2) Tax allowance unrelated to income. (3) No relief through tax system but cash transfers available to parents. (4) Tax allowances unrelated to income.

Countries representing the *familialistic* type show many similarities with countries of the first group. Nevertheless, they differ with regard to the following aspects (i) the objective of their family policy is centred on providing monetary transfers between married couples (traditional breadwinner – homemaker model) on the one hand, and individuals or non-marital living-arrangements on the other. To support emancipation interests is of minor importance to them, (ii) the duration of maternity leave schemes is longer, and these countries prefer generous perinatal leave schemes rather than a child-care leave which is to a smaller degree motivated in facilitating continuous labour force participation for women, (iii) the overall costs of this kind of family policy are lower than those of an etatistic policy, but markedly higher than the costs in the third regime type.

The peculiarities of the *individualistic* regime type are to be described in negative terms rather than in clearly structured preferences. These characteristics are (i) short duration of maternity leave, mostly linked with the absence of payment guarantees, and (ii) low tax rates, because social security expenditures as well as the maternity and family expenditures are much lower. In contrast, the average income (GDP p.c.) is often comparatively higher.

Table 5 Summary table on preferred interventions according to regime type

Regime type		preferred type of intervention	Policies	Dominant policy doctrine
<b>Etatistic regime</b>	Services (ecological)	Family Allowances (parity-specific)	++ -)	<b>Emancipation policy</b> (Conciliation of work and the family, norm of equality between gender)
		Perinatal maternity leave	++	
		Child-care leave	+	
		Public child-care (< 3)	++	
		Public child-care (3-6)	++	
		Low tax rates	--	
<b>Familialistic regime</b>	Payments (economic)	Family Allowances (parity-specific)	++ ++)	<b>Family policy</b> (strictu sensu) (breadwinner-homemaker fam. is the supported arrangement)
		Perinatal maternity leave	+	
		Child-care leave	++	
		Public child-care (< 3)	-	
		Public child-care (3-6)	+	
		Low tax rates	--	
<b>Individualistic regime</b>	No clear preferences	Family Allowances (parity-specific)	- -)	<b>Political abstention</b> (Family policy as a private matter) (choosing traditional family forms as a strategy to diminish tensions)
		Perinatal maternity leave	--	
		Child-care leave	-	
		Public day-care	-	
		Low tax rates	++	

#### 4. Towards a typology of family policy regimes in selected European countries

The intention of the following section is threefold. Firstly, the preceding description of inter-country heterogeneity will be tested by using multivariate methods. This will give additional evidence concerning the validity of the proposed typology. Secondly, included in the analysis are variables that refer to national welfare-state policies in a broader sense. If both policy fields – social policy as well as family policy – will show substantive similarities, this will allow us to generalise and to apply many of Esping-Andersen's theses on family related policies, too. Thirdly, it allows implicitly the rejection of the hypothesis according to which – since the middle of the 1960s – a new and homogeneous demographic regime diffuses from North to South without a striking impact of a country's historical and cultural preconditions. I do not follow the thesis that inter-country heterogeneity can be sufficiently explained by a forerunner (Scandinavia) late-

comer (Southern European peripheries) structure in the processes of modernisation and secularisation. The argument is that country-specific traditions and values are relevant to understand similarities and differences in demographic behaviour as well as concerning political strategies. This assumption will again be a topic in section 5, where the impact of a country's economic situation and the occurrence of family related value-orientations will be controlled for.

In order to cluster the strategies of national family policies, principal component analysis was applied. For the nine countries under observation (without the former GDR because of missing values) a matrix was compiled with eight family policy and welfare indicators. *X1*: Standardised family allowances for a two-child family (as documented in Tab. 1); *X2*: Index of maternity leave benefits (as documented in Tab. 2); *X3*: Duration of child-care leave (paid optional leave was weighted with a factor 2; rough figures are documented in Tab. 2); *X4*: Percentage of children below age 3 in publicly funded day-care institutions (as documented in Tab. 3); *X5*: Percentage of children 3 to school age enrolled in publicly funded day-care institutions (as documented in Tab. 3); *X6*: Value for combined de-commodification (Esping-Andersen 1990: 52); *X7-X9*: Cumulated index scores for conservative, socialist, and liberal regime attributes (Esping-Andersen 1990: 74).

*Table 6* Correlations, factor matrix, and factor scores of a Principal Component Analysis for nine welfare and family policy variables

**Correlation matrix:**

	<b>X1</b>	<b>X2</b>	<b>X3</b>	<b>X4</b>	<b>X5</b>	<b>X6</b>	<b>X7</b>	<b>X8</b>	<b>X9</b>
<b>X1:</b>	1.00								
<b>X2:</b>	0.39	1.00							
<b>X3:</b>	0.02	0.19	1.00						
<b>X4:</b>	0.41	0.88	0.46	1.00					
<b>X5:</b>	-0.10	0.43	0.53	0.53	1.00				
<b>X6:</b>	0.61	0.53	0.17	0.57	0.36	1.00			
<b>X7:</b>	-0.65	-0.28	0.50	-0.25	0.11	-0.42	1.00		
<b>X8:</b>	0.81	0.51	-0.01	0.54	0.02	0.89	-0.63	1.00	
<b>X9:</b>	-0.01	-0.49	0.05	-0.32	0.20	-0.20	0.11	-0.24	1.00

(Table 6 continued)

**Rotated factor matrix:**

	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>	<b>Factor 3</b>
<b>Combined de-commodification (X6)</b>	<b>0.86</b>	-0.01	0.20
<b>Socialist regime attributes (X8)</b>	<b>0.89</b>	-0.32	0.14
<b>Family allowances (X1)</b>	<b>0.75</b>	-0.39	0.31
<b>Day-care enrolment (ch. &lt;3) (X4)</b>	<b>0.83</b>	0.43	-0.15
<b>Conservative regime attributes (X7)</b>	-0.58	<b>0.65</b>	-0.12
<b>Child-care leave (X3)</b>	0.18	<b>0.82</b>	0.16
<b>Day-care enrolment (ch. 3-6) (X5)</b>	0.33	<b>0.75</b>	0.29
<b>Liberal regime attributes (X9)</b>	-0.35	0.06	<b>0.89</b>
<b>Maternity leave benefits (X2)</b>	0.81	0.28	<b>-0.36</b>

**Factor scores for the countries under observation:**

	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>	<b>Factor 3</b>
<b>Germany (East)</b>	<b>1.53</b>	0.90	-0.70
<b>Sweden</b>	<b>1.42</b>	-0.60	-0.87
<b>Denmark</b>	<b>1.09</b>	0.37	0.68
<b>France</b>	-0.45	<b>1.59</b>	0.83
<b>Italy</b>	-1.30	<b>1.01</b>	-0.70
<b>Germany (West)</b>	-0.61	<b>0.34</b>	-0.13
<b>Ireland</b>	-0.96	-0.51	-1.51
<b>Netherlands</b>	-0.02	-1.08	<b>0.62</b>
<b>Switzerland</b>	-0.27	-0.50	<b>1.85</b>
<b>United Kingdom</b>	-0.43	-1.53	-0.07

Three factors explaining 44.7%, 24.3%, and 13.7% were detected. The correlation matrix, the rotated factor matrix, and the factor scores for each country are listed in Table 6:

A first factor (etatism) is marked with high loadings for *de-commodification* („Th[is] concept refers to the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation“; cf. Esping-Andersen 1990: 37), *socialist regime attributes*, and *high family allowances* as well as *public child-care for children under three*. Also the duration of maternity leave benefits is positively correlated with this factor. On the other side, there is a sharp contrast to conservative and liberal regime attributes.

The second factor (familialism) is characterised by high loadings for *conservative regime attributes*, the regulation of *child-care leave*, and the percentage of children between age three and school-age enrolled in *public institutions*. As



concerning public child-care, one has to distinguish two different historical roots: on the one side, corresponding provisions aimed at an integration of children into the Catholic milieu (e.g. in Belgium, France), on the other hand public child-care provisions intend to lower the burdens of employed mothers and are therefore driven by emancipatory interests.

The third factor (individualism) has a high loading on *liberal regime attributes* and shows *negative* associations to *maternity leave* benefits, as well as *day-care enrolment for children age three and under*. Liberal regimes, as stressed above, define social-security as a private matter of individuals it seems plausible therefore that this factor shows negative loadings for most of the family policy incentives.

Regarding factor scores, GDR and Sweden (prototypes of an etatistic regime), France (prototype of a familialistic regime), and Switzerland (prototype of an individualistic regime) represent most clearly the three suggested dimensions. Denmark follows the etatistic pattern. Similarities to the familialistic regime are also found for Italy, and Germany (W). For Ireland, one can assume that a marked expansion of the family policy system has not yet commenced. In many respects traditional forms of self-help still substitute public provisions related to the family. As concerning the factor loadings, however, one can assume that Ireland belongs to the familialistic type rather than to one of the two other regimes. Furthermore, Netherlands, and the UK show similarities with the individualistic regime (liberalism). The Netherlands also show a zero score on the etatistic factor, which is fully compatible with the country's recent efforts in expanding social policy. Despite the liberal political culture the UK shows only a loading close to zero on the individualistic factor. In order to explain this finding, it is argued that the UK - in contrast to other liberal countries (e.g. Switzerland) - has to be characterised by its model-giving tradition in welfare policy focusing primarily on solving the problem of poverty. Obviously, this trajectory had also influenced the country's family policy. Also processes of societal differentiation which are correlated with the size of a country may increase the demand for politically managing the situation of families and should therefore be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, the results support the hypothetical map of family policy regimes, as pointed out in the preceding section. Furthermore, the findings contradict a simple forerunner-latecomer assumption.

## **5. Interrelations between the economic situation, family related values, and family policy regimes**

As the Swedish experience shows (cf. T. Meisaari-Polsa 1997), the etatistic family policy aims at supporting gender equality and providing benefits for a variety of living-arrangements. Countries following this pattern tend to enrich the spectrum of options for couples. In these cases, services (ecological interventions) as

well as monetary benefits are clearly most developed.


The main interests of a familialistic family policy regime, on the other hand, act to balance the income situation between parents and childless people and to stimulate reproductive behaviour (see the French case). Strong economic interventions, for example high family allowances (progressive with children's parity) belong to the preferred policies of these countries.

The main characteristics of the individualistic family policy pattern are the lack of adequate provisions. The following figures intend to show that this is only half the truth. The implicit strategy of these countries – often legitimised by a liberal doctrine – is to define family issues as a mere private matter. Therefore in countries like Switzerland we observe the combination of a high level of earnings, a very low average tax rate (e.g.: Table 4) and low social security and family policy expenditures (Figures 3 and 4). Furthermore, the absence of explicit provisions should not allow neglect of the implicit recognition of family related obligations. For example, the revised old-age pension scheme in Switzerland recognises women's achievements in child-care in an internationally exemplary manner.

Generally, the plots show a positive correlation between the amount of social security and family policy expenditures in relation to a country's monetary situation (GDP/c.). It seems evident that wealthy countries are normally more generous in providing family policy offers while countries disposing on smaller economic resources are frequently forced to restrict governmental support for families. Nevertheless, economic determinants are far from being an exhaustive explanation for the choice of political strategies. There exist countries which do not lay within the slope of the 95% confidence interval in these plots, namely some of the Scandinavian countries providing comparatively more generous offers, or Switzerland, and the UK (regarding family related provisions and services: Switzerland and Italy) which use significantly smaller proportions of their economic resources for welfare and family policy purposes.


The next section examines whether apart from macro- and micro-economic variables, the distribution and dominance of family related values and attitudes (cultural resources) have an impact on the rational choice of a political strategy in the field of family policy. Again, principal component analysis is applied. The hypothesis suggests high correlations between the form of political interventions (regime type) and the occurrence of corresponding values. Values, such as gender-equality and tolerance are assumed to be associated with etatistic regimes. Religiosity and support for marriage and a traditional division of labour between spouses are considered close to familialism. Personal self-fulfilment should correlate with individualism.

Figure 3 Social security expenditure as a percentage of GDP per capita 1990.



Source: OECD (1999), Social security expenditure database (SOCX), Paris.

Figure 4 Family cash benefits and family services expenditure as a percentage of GDP per capita, 1990



Source: OECD (1999), Social security expenditure database (SOCX), Paris.

Seven variables were entered in the following analysis: X1: Support of abortion, if woman is not married (% who approve); X2: Marriage is not an outdated institution (% support for marriage); X3: Equal rights for men and women

(% support); X4: Percentage of church-attendance (at least once a week); X5: Percentage of Postmaterialists in 1986/7 (deflated figures); X6: Tolerance towards lone-parent families (% who agree with the item: "Do you approve, if a woman wants a child, but doesn't want a stable relationship with a man"); X7: Catholics as a proportion of the total population.

Table 7. *Family related values and attitudes in selected European countries around 1990*

Country	X1	X2	X3	X4	X5	X6	X7
<b>Denmark</b>	60	82	75	5	18	80	0
<b>France</b>	24	88	58	10	14	37	80
<b>Germany (W)</b>	21	85	54	19	24	22	41
<b>Germany (E)</b>	34	84	60	13	10	34	49
<b>Ireland</b>	8	90	58	81	9	23	94
<b>Italy</b>	26	86	44	40	11	38	99
<b>Netherlands</b>	27	79	68	21	25	37	36
<b>Sweden</b>	60	85	75	5	18	80	1
<b>Switzerland</b>	46	86	62	24	16	51	48
<b>United Kingdom</b>	39	81	60	13	15	73	25

Source: Ashford, Sh. and Timms, N. 1992 (EVS 1990); Simons 1994 (EVS 1980 and 1990); Lesthaeghe and Moors 1994 (EVS 1980 and 1990); Fux et al. 1993; Eurostat (ed.) (various years), Eurostat yearbook. A statistical eye on Europe, Luxembourg; Federal Statistical Office (ed.) (various years), Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz (Statistical Yearbook of Switzerland), NZZ-Verlag: Zürich; Statistiska Centralbyrån (ed.) (various years), *Statistisk årsbok, Stockholm*.

Most of the data are derived from the 1990 wave of the European value study (EVS). For Switzerland, corresponding data from the study: „Bevölkerung & Wohlfahrt“ (Fux et al. 1993; Fux et al. 1997). Raw data are documented in Table 7.

Table 8 summarises the results of the principal component analysis (PCA). Three factors explain 64%, 17% and 8% of the variance. In accordance with our hypothesis, tolerance (with regard to abortion and lone-parenthood) and gender equality as well as low proportions of Catholics make up a first factor. A second factor is shaped by a high importance given to marriage and a high proportion of people practising a religion. The third factor is positively associated with the percentage of postmaterialists (personal self-fulfilment is one dimension of Inglehart's concept (Inglehart 1990).

Again, both Scandinavian countries rank highest on the first factor. Also the UK and Switzerland show positive loadings. This may be caused by the liberal culture of these countries which implies a certain tolerance. Ireland and Italy show highest loadings on the 'marriage'-factor, but disclose differences on both other factors. Also, France and the confessionally mixed Switzerland show posi-

tive loadings. The cases of Sweden and the Eastern parts of Germany which are positively associated with this factor, too, indicate that the norms of gender equality and tolerance on the one hand and the esteem for marriage and the family as an institution must not be contradictory. Netherlands and also the Western part of Germany represent most clearly factor three.

Table 8 *Correlations, rotated factor matrix, and factor scores of a Principal Component Analysis for seven attitudinal variables*

**Correlation matrix:**

	<b>X1</b>	<b>X2</b>	<b>X3</b>	<b>X4</b>	<b>X5</b>	<b>X6</b>	<b>X7</b>
<b>X1:</b>	1.00						
<b>X2:</b>	-0.42	1.00					
<b>X3:</b>	0.71	-0.42	1.00				
<b>X4:</b>	-0.70	0.57	-0.46	1.00			
<b>X5:</b>	0.21	-0.60	0.39	-0.46	1.00		
<b>X6:</b>	0.90	-0.43	0.67	-0.57	0.12	1.00	
<b>X7:</b>	-0.81	0.66	-0.82	0.71	-0.57	-0.76	1.00

**Rotated factor matrix:**

	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>	<b>Factor 3</b>
<b>Agree w. abortion if woman is unmarried (X1)</b>	<b>0.97</b>	-0.06	0.06
<b>Tolerance towards monoparental families (X6)</b>	<b>0.96</b>	0.11	-0.02
<b>Equal rights for men and women (X3)</b>	<b>0.77</b>	0.07	0.40
<b>Percentage of Catholics (X7)</b>	<b>-0.82</b>	0.11	-0.49
<b>Marriage is not an out-dated institution (X2)</b>	0.17	<b>0.97</b>	-0.04
<b>Percentage of church-attendance(X4)</b>	-0.64	<b>0.68</b>	-0.27
<b>Percentage of Postmaterialists (X5)</b>	0.13	-0.12	<b>0.97</b>

**Factor scores for the countries under observation:**

Country	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Sweden	<b>1.54</b>	0.34	0.76
Denmark	<b>1.54</b>	-0.02	0.41
United Kingdom	0.63	-0.02	-0.96
Ireland	-1.35	<b>1.16</b>	-2.02
Italy	-0.92	<b>0.81</b>	-1.36
France	-0.46	0.44	-0.58
Germany (E)	-0.03	0.43	-0.85
Switzerland	0.27	0.38	0.15
Netherlands	-0.30	-1.06	<b>1.54</b>
Germany (W)	-0.91	-1.46	<b>1.12</b>

Table 9 supports the hypothesis that assumes a strong interdependence between the dominance of certain values and the feature of a country's family policy system (the correlation coefficients between the two principal component analyses). The etatistic type of family policy is linked to gender equality and tolerance (.71). The familialistic type of family policy is also positively associated with a positive rating of marriage and the family (.30). However, the fact that a) also in countries like Sweden and the former GDR marriage is not evaluated as an outdated institution and b) that a marked secularisation is also to be found in France, is causing a coefficient that is statistically not significant. Again, no significance, but nonetheless a positive association was found between the individualistic type and the percentage of postmaterialists (.54).

*Table 9 Correlation between family policy regimes (factor scores) and value dimensions (factor scores)*

Family policy regimes	family related values:		
	Equality/Tolerance Factor 1	Marriage Factor 2	Postmaterialism Factor 3
<b>Etatism (Factor 1)</b>	<b>.71</b> *		
<b>Familialism (Factor 2)</b>	-.05	<b>.30</b>	
<b>Individualism (Factor 3)</b>	.57	-.19	<b>.54</b>

\* = Signif. LE .05 (2-tailed)

According to these hypotheses on national family policies regimes, the countries under observation will be grouped for further analyses as follows: the two Scandinavian states Sweden and Denmark including the former GDR follow the etatistic type. According to the above-mentioned considerations France, Ireland, Italy, and the Western part of Germany follow the familialistic pattern. Switzerland, the UK, and Netherlands belong to the individualistic pattern.

Many of these ten countries, however, do not wholly represent any one of

the regime types. Not least for this reason, it seems impossible to show clear-cut and causal effects of these clusters of family related interventions on a certain behavioural outcome. Nevertheless, in the next section it is considered useful to attempt to formulate concise impact hypotheses. It is acknowledged that many of them require much more work in order to qualify them as effected by rational policies. Furthermore, ideas which can be elaborated in further analyses in this field are presented.

## **6. Hypotheses on the potential impact of family policy measures on family-types and family life**

Policy offers may influence individuals and/or families in different ways. Reference will be made to the potential impact (a) on the temporal *organisation of the family cycle*, (b) on the differentiation of *living-arrangements (pluralisation, polarisation)*, (c) on *female labour force participation*, and (d) on *reproductive behaviour*. Of course, these dimensions are not independent of each other. The aim here is to formulate impact hypotheses, to discuss potential mechanisms leading to a certain behavioural outcome, and to show some preliminary circumstantial evidence based on macro-data. One has to keep in mind that this is only a very first step towards a satisfying quantification of impact models.

### *6.1 Family policy and its impact on the temporal organisation of the family cycle*

The increase in the number of women receiving a better education not least due to the expansion of the educational systems (cf. Blossfeld 1987; Blossfeld et al. 1992; Federkeil 1992: 41), and the increase in the number of (married) mothers who combine occupation and looking after the family in order to take advantage of their improved resources, are undoubtedly focal points of the process of modernisation in European societies.

The participation in this process should have an impact on the temporal organisation of the family cycle. From the perspective of women, the traditional organisation of the family cycle is characterised by a non-existing or short interval between leaving the parental home and the beginning of a (normally) marital partnership and procreation is following marriage. Regarding female employment, the traditional life course is mainly divided in two phases: the employment frequently ends when a women marries, or when she is giving birth to a child (2-phases model). In countries, following the familialistic trajectory (affected by the Catholic value system and comparatively weaker economies, particularly in the European peripheries), this pattern is more often to be found. I would argue, that also the particular family policy instruments of this regime type (parity specific allowances, child-care leave) support women's decision to organise their life cy-

cle in correspondence with this pattern.

By contrast, since educational attainment and employment favours the autonomy of women, one can hypothesise that the spread of modern values in line with an emancipation oriented family policy by means of ecological rather than economic interventions (Meisaari-Polsa 1997), as supposed for countries following the etatistic trajectory, will affect the temporal organisation of the family cycle in different ways. Firstly, the link between leaving the parental home and the foundation of a marital partnership should become weaker in these cases (inducing the spread and longer duration of premarital singlehood). Secondly, Because a higher degree of individual autonomy enables women to decide rationally on the timing of marriage, child-birth, and the sequence of both, the ties between parenthood and marriage are getting weaker. Aggregated data for Sweden, Denmark and the former GDR show that in 1990 the age of women at their first birth is lower than female first marriage age indicating a frequent reversed sequence of procreation and marriage. Although, one should be cautious in interpreting these differences, since they depend on total marriage rates (TMR) and the proportions of births out-of-wedlock. Again, however, analyses on individual data level support the hypothesis of a process towards weaker ties between marriage and procreation (Huinink 1995; Fux and Baumgartner 1998). Thirdly, the uncoupling of marriage and reproductive behaviour furthermore stimulates the pluralisation of living-arrangements (e.g. increasing proportions of non-marital cohabitation, intended or unintended lone-parent families, or living-arrangements where both spouses are gainfully employed). Fourthly, Such a modernisation of the temporal organisation of the family cycle should also affect fertility via the postponement of first births (cf. women's age at first birth in: Council of Europe 1993) and an accelerated nuclearisation of family sizes.

If ideal-typically the familialistic family policy is supporting a more traditional organisation of the family cycle, and the etatistic path furthers the process of modernisation, then one can assume for countries providing an individualistic policy a certain mixture between more traditional and modern characteristics in the life-course organisation. On the one side, women frequently attain higher educational levels, share modern values (see Dorbritz and Fux 1997), and are gainfully employed. By consequence, the spread and prolongation of premarital singlehood, the occurrence of unmarried cohabitations, or the postponement of marriage and first births are quite common. Restrictive conditions such as the lack in parental leave, and few and costly child-care services, however, may function as a source of tension due to difficulties in finding appropriate ways of combining occupation and the family. Under these preconditions, women tend more frequently to reduce their workload (part-time arrangements), to quit their jobs only for the duration of a baby-break, or they decide not to have children (Fux 1998). On the other side, and in compliance with countries providing a familialistic family policy, extramarital births are rare within the group of individualistic countries, namely in Switzerland and the Netherlands. An explanation



for such a traditional backlash may be that the decision to marry in conjunction with the decision to become a parent, is frequently the result of instrumental or pragmatic considerations of the couple rather than based on fundamental value orientations (see Fux and Baumgartner 1998).

The guiding idea of this section was to outline the impact of different family policy regimes on the temporal structuration of the family cycle. The first argument is that a familialistic regime is integrating individuals and couples into a traditional 'Lebenswelt' by strongly supporting the institution of marriage, kinship ties, and by hampering the emancipation of women, although there exist gradual differences within this group of countries. Particularly larger countries like France or Germany tend to converge with modernised countries. Secondly, etatistic policies accentuate the emancipation of individuals from traditional ties and integrate people into a modern society, particularly by means of ecological and work related incentives. By consequence, individuals and couples are to a lower degree bound to follow a standardised life cycle and a prescribed sequence of biographical events. On the contrary, this trajectory allows individuals much more to rationally choose among different options according to their own interests and resources. Again, it must be stressed that the proposed typology of family policy regimes simplifies reality. Although the former socialist countries are placed into the group of etatistic countries, one should not overlook for example that they significantly differ from the Scandinavian countries in many respects. Female labour force integration in socialist countries was for example rather an economic necessity than the result of a free choice. Also, with regard to marital behaviour, there exist striking differences between the Nordic and the former socialist countries (cf. Hajnal 1953; 1965; Rychtarikova 1993: 191ff.). Thirdly, As concerns the individualistic trajectory, one would assume that the far reaching absence of the state intensified the level of conflicts, couples are confronted with. Participating in the process of modernisation, but to be hardly relieved of the 'costs' of modernisation, individuals frequently combine traditional and modern behaviours. This mixing of patterns, however, goes in line with a redefinition of traditional institutions. Marriage for example tends to become a means to the end of efficiently organising family life (instrumentalisation of marriage) and is no longer anchored in a system of traditional values.

## 6.2 *Family policy and its impact on the spread of new living-arrangements*

According to the preceding hypotheses, the potential family policy impact on the temporal organisation of the family cycle is highly interrelated with other dimensions of family life, such as the development of new living-arrangements, female labour force participation, or procreative behaviour. The following paragraph stresses presumable positive and negative affirmation effects on the growth of

new living-arrangements in a narrow sense.

As already mentioned, there are increases in one-person households (see Höpflinger 1997: 102) and high proportions of premarital singles in countries out of the etatistic and the individualistic group, which is in marked contrast to familialistic countries where young people remain longer in their parental households (see Table 10). Improved education and in general the participation in the process of modernisation (e.g. social and regional mobility) stimulated this development, while the kinship and family orientation in countries like Italy and Ireland may have a negative impact on the growth of this living form. By contrast, a familialistic regime should have an affirmation effect on the occurrence of larger families. Data on the proportion of five+ person households (Höpflinger 1997: 100) and data on the average household size (Linke 1989) support this hypotheses, even if the occurrence of three+ person households show only minor variation by regime type.

Another striking phenomenon is certainly the development of unmarried cohabitation. A policy directed towards individual emancipation as in the etatistic case reduces the thresholds for choosing a non-marital living form. The high proportions of consensual unions in the Scandinavian countries (see Table 10) and in many of the former socialist countries (Klijzing and Macura 1997; Fux and Baumgartner 1998) confirms this assumption. Also found are high proportions of unmarried cohabitation in countries providing an individualistic policy. This group of countries, however, shows hardly any consensual unions with children. Detailed analyses for Switzerland showed that certain disadvantages of married families (e.g. with regard to fiscal policy) in line with the above-mentioned trend to interpret marriage more pragmatically motivates couples to remain unmarried as long as they did not want to become parents (Fux and Baumgartner 1998).

Table 10 gives the distribution of the most frequent living forms for women in their early parental phase, as determined by the country reports of this project (Kaufmann et al. 1997). Data refer to different but functionally equivalent age-groups and allow a summary of our hypotheses on the potential impact of family policies on the variation of living arrangements. One can say that an etatistic regime has an affirmative effect on the choice of living arrangements. In this case we can speak of a factual pluralisation. Nevertheless, the culturally defined meaning of marriage (e.g. in the former GDR) or traditions (e.g. nuptiality in Eastern European countries) may explain the high proportions of married couples with children in some countries out of this group.

Also in familialistic countries, the marriage based living form is very frequent. More than two thirds of women in their early parental phase practise this arrangement. To conclude, the familialistic regime type has an impact on the choice of living arrangements insofar as a corresponding policy is hampering the process of pluralisation.

The third regime type (individualistic policy) shows some relevant differ-

ences compared to the etatistic regime. Couples who remain childless are significantly overrepresented and the decision to give birth to a child strongly motivates couples to marry. This invokes, in general, a polarisation between the family and non-family sector (see Dorbritz and Fux 1997) rather than a pluralisation of living arrangements.

*Table 10 Living arrangements of women in early parental phase by family policy regime, late 1980s*

Country	Living in parental household	Sing-les	Cohabitation, no child	Cohabitation, children	Lone mother	Married, no child	Married with child(ren)	Divorced <sup>1</sup>	Other forms <sup>2</sup>
<b>Etatism</b>									
Denmark	1.9	13.0	19.6	10.0	3.5	7.1	23.3	1.1	20.4
Germany (E)	5.9	16.0	3.7	10.8	5.9	5.7	46.7	•	5.3
Sweden	•	25.3	12.8	13.4	4.5	5.1	25.1	•	13.8
<b>Familialism</b>									
Ireland	29.3	12.6	•	•	•	8.6	38.8	2.4	8.3
Italy	36.0	3.0	1.0	•	1.0	14.0	42.0	•	3.0
Germany (W)	•	22.4	9.1	•	•	8.8	38.8	•	20.9
<b>Individualism</b>									
Netherlands	7.3	16.4	14.6	•	•	18.5	26.3	•	16.9
Switzerland	•	21.3	17.7	•	•	23.3	23.6	•	14.1
Great Britain	9.0	9.0	•	•	15.0	15.0	33.0	•	19.0

*Sources:* Compiled from various country reports (Cf. A. Kuijsten: Variation and change in family forms in the 1980s, forthcoming (add to reference list?)). Notes: (1) Including widowed/separated p. (with or without children). (2) Difference to 100.

### 6.3 *Family policy and its impact on female labour force participation*

Considering the potential impact of family policy on female labour force participation one can assume that parental leave as well as child-care programmes reduce child-care costs as well as facilitate the organisation of everyday life. Therefore, an affirmation effect on female activity is expected. This conclusion was at least partly supported by other studies. Heckman, as well as, Blau and Robins found evidence for the fact that higher child-care costs encourage the exit from paid employment, and deter the entry into paid employment. (Heckman 1974, Blau and Robins 1989, Fux 1992). However, the results are controversial. A subsequent study of Robins and Blau (1991) could not confirm the expected effect of cash transfers on the likelihood of taking an employment. A study of Susan McRae examined the propensity to return to work after childbirth. The author found that women in receipt of contractual maternity pay (occupational benefit) were two and one-half times more likely to return to work after child-

birth than women on ordinary public maternity pay (McRae 1991: 232, see also Gauthier 1993). Further evidence was given by Federkeil who found a positive correlation between female activity rates and the enrolment of children below age 10 (Federkeil 1992: 71; Schulze 1993: 35).

Gauthier discusses several studies which proved the impact of benefits to lone-mothers. Again, the results are controversial. There is some evidence according to which additional income support lowers the probability of employment of lone-mothers.

By considering the possible impact of family policy on occupational behaviour one should take into account that employment – including female labour force participation – depends on a state's economical situation and trend. A great effort would be necessary to filter out these interrelations between macro-economic processes and female labour force participation, which of course cannot be done in this context. It should be noted that in most European states the share of employed women increased during the 1980s. That would indicate that the process of assimilation of occupational patterns between both sexes is still continuing. In the European community there are three countries that deviate from this general trend. In the UK, both the number of male and female employees dropped during the period 1983 to 1991. In the Netherlands the number of female employees in relation to the total employment rate remained approximately unchanged while the number of male employees rose slightly. In Denmark, both activity rates increased, but the growth rate was higher among men.

One should note that such an overall picture based on the total activity rate of women is far from being satisfactory. However, international comparative data that would allow for explicit study of the interrelations between family policy and the reconciliation of work and the family are relatively scarce. Even in the standard tables of most national labour force surveys there exist hardly any breakdowns related to the family situation and household composition of employees. Furthermore, most available socio-demographic indicators are of mean values only which do not refer to either the life-course dynamics nor the family-cycle of individuals.

Nevertheless, in order to formulate impact hypotheses, it is intended to differentiate female labour force participation according to age (life-course pattern), extent of occupation (full-time, part-time), civil state and number of children.

On arguing that family policy incentives might have some impact on female occupational behaviour in the sense that availability of benefits and facilities allows women either to choose an occupation or to better reconcile both fields, some tentative hypotheses have to be considered and illustrated on the base of rough data.

As mentioned in a previous section (temporal reorganisation of the family cycle) female labour force participation characteristically differs between the three regime types. In Scandinavian countries such as Sweden or Denmark as

well as in many of the former socialist countries, one can observe a rapid assimilation of the age-specific activity rates between men and women. An emancipatory family policy, and in particular well developed leave schemes and child-care services allows women in these countries to remain in the labour force even after marriage and/or giving birth to children. In other words: the increasing work-orientation of women in line with the process of modernisation can be seen as a pressure of women to obtain (gender)equality. The aim of governmental policies in this respect is to support these demands and to reduce or even abolish structural and cultural counter-pressures interfering with the demands of women.

By comparing the Scandinavian and the former socialist countries, however, one should not overlook that particularly women in the Eastern European countries were frequently forced to be gainfully employed in order to contribute to the household income (Wendt 1997). By consequence, high female employment rates in the former socialist countries in fact do not indicate an emancipation of women. It would be certainly too idealistic to speak of an absence of any form of counter-pressure in these countries, but both, the economic conditions (counter-pressure) and the demands of women (pressure) tend into the same direction effecting an inverted u-shaped activity pattern of women (cf. A. Myrdal 1945; Hoem 1990, Sundström and Stafford 1992; Vaskovics et al. 1994: 25f or Wennemo 1994).

Women in familialistic countries, by contrast, are faced with more traditional gender norms as well as age-specific structural thresholds, effecting a positive skewness in the distribution of age-specific female activity rates.<sup>2</sup> One can argue that a familialistic family policy is characterised by two opposed objectives: On the one hand, it is aimed at a minimisation of structural tensions - by means of child care leave rather than parental leave, (parity specific) child allowances, and child-care services (cf. table 5). On the other side, a familialistic policy explicitly tends to support women in their role as mother and home-maker. By consequence, the correspondence of traditional gender norms and this type of policy leads to a persistence of more traditional behavioural patterns, particularly in older age groups.

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<sup>2</sup> France as well as Germany show nowadays an m-shaped participation curve. However, by reviewing corresponding distributions in the past (Comm. of the EC, Employment in Europe, 1993: 151) one can show that in both countries until the middle of the 1980 no, or only a marginal increase in female employment among women aged 40 and onwards occurred. One can assume that the continuity and the extent of family policy incentives in France stimulated occupational behaviour leading to an assimilation with the countries of the first group. But, until about 1970, France followed approximately the average trend of this group. If female employment in France tends to develop towards an inverted u-shape distribution, then the curve for the Western part of Germany follows the third group more closely.

In opposition to this second pattern, women in individualistic countries experience heaviest barriers particularly during their family formation phase. The lacks in child care facilities and leave schemes makes it more difficult to adequately organise everyday life and comparatively low child allowances do not compensate the resulting costs if a couple decides to practice the home-maker-breadwinner model. By consequence, age-specific participation rates in individualistic countries let observe an m-shaped distribution. In other words: there is a more pronounced drop in female employment around women's mean age at birth of their first child (age 25 to 35). In older age-groups, women frequently recommence to work outside home, however, with a high probability in the form of part-time arrangements. Part-time employment expanded markedly during the past decade. Not least this fact was responsible for the growth in activity rates over the 1980s. In most countries part-time working is up to now predominantly a female preserve. Within the EU, women accounted for between 76% to 90% of all part-time employment in 1990 (Commission of the EU: *Employment in Europe 1993*: 159). However, the term "part-time employment" is far from being a comprehensive and unequivocal expression. The notion is used to describe marginal occupation as well as close to a full-time workload. Furthermore, part-time working depends on the availability of corresponding jobs and the economic situation of a country as well as on age, marital status, and number of children.

Figure 6 provides an overview on how (around 1991) women aged 20 to 49 in a sample of countries combine employment and family responsibilities. The observed distributions support the above-mentioned hypotheses. Combining a full-time employment and the tasks of motherhood is most frequent in the two Eastern European countries, namely Czechoslovakia and the former GDR. Though none of the Scandinavian countries participated in this study, there is no doubt that this is also the case in Sweden or Denmark (cf. Figure 5, diagram below, left side). One can conclude that this type of work-orientation and labour force integration is the predominant pattern in the former socialist area as well as in the Northern European countries. By contrast, at least in some of the familialistic countries (Spain, the Western parts of Germany, and Italy), the proportions of mothers who are not gainfully employed is significantly higher. Belgium and Austria, subsumed to the same regime type, show a more equal distribution between different modes to reconcile work and the family. I would argue that work-related policies in these countries provides women the opportunity to choose between the different alternatives. In countries like Switzerland and the Netherlands, one finds the highest share of younger childless women who are working full-time. To combine a full workload with the responsibilities as a mother is rather an exception. If women do not want to drop out of the labour force, they are evidently forced to look for part-time arrangements. Compared with both other regime types, the polarisation between either experiencing motherhood, or remaining in the labour force, is much more accentuated.

Figure 5 Hypothetical and empirical paces of female labour force integration by regime-type





Figure 6 Reconciling of employment and the family in selected European countries,



women 20-44 (around 1991)

Sources: Population Policy Acceptance Surveys.

#### 6.4 Family policy and its impact on reproductive behaviour

Many studies exist which deal with the effects of economical benefits and parental leave provisions on procreative behaviour. At present there is a far-reaching consensus according to which family policy has no, or only a marginal pronatalist impact. Even for cash benefits equivalent to those provided by the French system the long-term positive effect is only about 0.2 children per woman (Calot, 1978, Höhn and Schubnell 1986, Schwarz 1988, Ekert 1986, Blanchet and Ekert-Jaffé 1988, Gauthier 1993, Fux et al. 1997, Dorbritz and Fux 1997). This does not exclude parity-specific effects (encouraging third or higher ranking births) or impacts on the timing of births in terms of encouraging early parenthood (Cigno and Ermisch 1987, Fux 1994). Generally, one can argue that most of the assumed natalist effects are mediated by changes in the temporal organisation of the family cycle and/or by the increasing labour force participation of women.

Some tentative hypotheses on indirect family policy effects on procreation were already discussed in previous paragraphs. An additional comment is that age-specific period total fertility rates, broken down by regime type show no



significant correlation. In other words: fertility seems to be relatively independent from the performance of a country's family policy. Differences between countries rather refer to different patterns with regard to the timing of births, therefore the organisation of the family cycle. Nevertheless, the available data are by no means sufficient to support such a far-reaching hypothesis.

## **7. Conclusion and outlook**

This chapter aimed to develop ideas on the hypothetical impact of family related policies on human behaviour. Since being sceptical whether there exist direct, causal and long-term effects of governmental family policies, in particular on procreative behaviour, the discussion focused on a model of dynamic interdependencies which can be easily linked with considerations deriving from rational choice theory.

In subsequent steps, the heterogeneity of family policy systems in ten European countries was described; this led to a typology of three family policy regimes. A principal component analysis allowed the clustering of our sample of countries into an etatistic, a familialistic, and an individualistic group. A second principal component analysis was supporting the assumed strong interrelations between the occurrence of basic values on the one side and a country's family policy feature on the other.

In the following sections, impact hypotheses were formulated which related to a) the temporal organisation of the family cycle, b) the process of pluralisation of living-arrangements, c) female labour force participation, and d) procreative behaviour. However, not least because appropriate data are lacking, it was not possible to test these hypotheses (see Figure 7).

It was then attempted to draft that a familialistic family policy in conjunction with more traditional values hampers the modernisation of the temporal organisation of the family cycle. Leaving the parental household, forming a partnership and becoming a parent normally succeed one another. The role of women in this regime type is that of a homemaker. By consequence, young mothers more frequently drop out of the labour force, a fact which is certainly also influenced by the economic preconditions. As concerns the growth of new living forms, a gravitation to marital arrangements is assumed. The increase of singles, lone-parents, and unmarried cohabitations are less accentuated. Since both, traditional values and a more marriage-oriented policy is promoting strong kinship ties, the nuclearisation of the family commenced later (larger average family sizes), and extramarital fertility did not yet increase markedly.

The etatistic trajectory can be seen as the counterexample to the familialistic regime. A rapid secularisation and a family policy enabling, in particular, women to choose among different behavioural options furthered a rapid modernisation of the family cycle. Prescriptions related to the sequencing of bio-

graphical events became weaker and women's lifelong participation in the labour force is the rule. One can observe therefore a greater variation in living arrangements. The etatistic regime allows couples also to have their children outside marriage. Therefore extramarital fertility is highest in this cluster of countries.

Figure 7 Summary of hypothetical family policy impacts

	Family cycle	Pattern of fem. labour force participation	New living arrangements	Fertility and reproductive patterns
Family policy regime and distribution of resources and values	<b>Familialistic trajectory</b> Traditional organisation	Low participation at older ages; fewer part-time a.	smaller variation; gravitation t. marital arrangements	late nuclearisation, larger family size low extramar. fert.
	<b>Individualistic trajectory</b> Modernized organisation	M-shaped distrib. Very frequent part-time arrang.	Singles, Cohabitations, and Lone-parents increase	postponement, polarisation, low extramar. fert.
	<b>Etatistic trajectory</b>	Inverse U-shape pattern; frequent part-time a.	Singles, Cohabitations, and Lone-parents increase	postponement, high extramar. fertility

Also, the individualistic trajectory is characterised by a rapid modernisation of values. However, the state is defining family life much more as a private matter of individuals and couples. In particular, a smaller amount of resources is devoted to reduce the 'costs' of modernisation. By consequence, one can observe in different fields a strong polarisation of behaviours. Women, for example, more frequently remain childless for the sake of their career interests. They also more frequently drop out of the labour force for the duration of a baby-break (m-shaped distribution), or they choose part-time arrangements in order to reconcile both interests. As concerns the growth of new living-forms, we find particularly within younger age-groups a strong pluralisation similar to that in etatistic countries. The decision to become parents, however, motivates couples frequently to move into a more traditional arrangement. By consequence, one can observe a subcutaneous change in the meaning of traditional institutions (e.g. marriage is frequently the result of pragmatic or instrumental considerations of the couple). Due to these preconditions, it is not surprising that extramarital fertility is still comparatively low.

To conclude, the etatistic family policy pattern is actively stimulating the process of societal modernisation by means of reducing or abolishing many of the thresholds and barriers families are confronted with. By contrast, the familialistic policy regime aims at supporting families who follow more traditional paths. The particularity of the individualistic regime may be seen in the absence of the state in family related matters. Couples are therefore obliged to self-organise their interests. The price is a more pronounced polarisation in individual behaviours in various fields.

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